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We investigate whether individuals exhibit forward looking behavior in their response to the non-linear
pricing common in health insurance contracts. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that employees
who join an employer-provided health insurance plan later in the calendar year face the same initial
("spot") price of medical care but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price than employees who
join the same plan earlier in the year. Our results reject the null of completely myopic behavior; medical
utilization appears to respond to the future price, with a statistically significant elasticity of medical
utilization with respect to the future price of -0.4 to -0.6. To try to quantify the extent of forward looking
behavior, we develop a stylized dynamic model of individual behavior and calibrate it using our estimated
behavioral response and additional data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Our calibration
suggests that the elasticity estimate may be substantially smaller than the one implied by fully forward-looking
behavior, yet it is sufficiently high to have an economically significant effect on the response of annual
medical utilization to a non-linear health insurance contract. Overall, our results point to the empirical
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The size and rapid growth of the healthcare sector — and the pressure this places on public sector
budgets — has created great interest among both academics and policymakers in possible approaches
to reducing healthcare spending. On the demand side, the standard, long-standing approach to
constraining healthcare spending is through consumer cost sharing in health insurance, such as
deductibles and coinsurance. Not surprisingly therefore, there is a substantial academic literature
devoted to trying to quantify how the design of health insurance contracts aﬀects medical spending.
These estimates have important implications for the costs of alternative health insurance contracts,
and hence for the optimal design of private insurance contracts or social insurance programs.
One aspect of this literature that we ﬁnd remarkable is the near consensus on the nature of
the endeavor: the attempt to quantify the response of medical spending with respect to its (out-
of-pocket) price to the consumer. Yet, health insurance contracts in the United States are highly
non-linear, so trying to estimate the behavioral response to a single out-of-pocket price is, in most
cases, not a well-posed exercise, as it begs the question “which price?”. A typical private health
insurance plan has a deductible, a coinsurance rate, and an out-of-pocket maximum (or “stop loss”).
The consumer faces a price of 100% of medical expenditures until he has spent the deductible, at
which point the marginal price falls sharply to the coinsurance rate (typically around 10-20%), and
then falls to zero once out-of-pocket expenditures have reached the stop-loss amount. Public health
insurance programs, such as Medicare, also involve non-linear schedules, including occasionally
schedules in which the marginal price rises over some expenditure range and then falls again (as in
the famous “doughnut hole” in Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage).
In the context of such non-linear budget sets, trying to characterize an insurance policy by a
single price could produce very misleading inferences. For example, one cannot extrapolate from es-
timates of the eﬀect of coinsurance on health spending to the eﬀects of introducing a high-deductible
health insurance plan without knowing how forward looking individuals are in their response to
health insurance coverage. A completely myopic individual would respond to the introduction of a
deductible as if his “price” has sharply increased to 100%, whereas a fully forward looking individual
with annual health expenditures that are likely to exceed the new deductible would experience little
change in the eﬀective marginal price of care and therefore might not change his behavior much.1
Understanding how medical spending responds to the design of health insurance contracts therefore
requires that we understand how consumers account for the non-linear budget schedule they face
1Indeed, once one accounts for the non-linear contract design, even characterizing which insurance contract would
provide greater incentives to economize on medical spending becomes a complicated matter. Consider, for example,
two plans with a coinsurance arm that is followed by an out-of-pocket maximum of $5,000. Imagine that Plan A has
a 10% coinsurance rate and plan B has a 50% coinsurance rate. Which plan would induce less spending? The naive
answer would be that Plan B is less generous and would therefore lead to lower medical utilization. Yet, the answer
depends on the distribution of medical spending without insurance, as well as on how forward looking individuals
are. For example, an individual who suﬀers a compound fracture early in the coverage period and spends $10,000
on a surgery would eﬀectively obtain full insurance coverage for the rest of the year under Plan B, but would face a
10% coinsurance rate (with a remaining $4,000 stop loss) under Plan A. We would therefore expect this individual
to have greater medical utilization under Plan B.
1in making their medical consumption decisions. A fully rational, forward-looking individual who
is not liquidity constrained should recognize that the “spot” price applied to a particular claim is
not relevant; this nominal price should not aﬀect his consumption decisions. Rather, the decision
regarding whether to undertake some medical care should be a function only of the end-of-year
price.
In this paper, we therefore investigate whether and to what extent individuals respond to
the expected end-of-year price, or “future price,” of medical care. We do so in the context of
employer-provided health insurance in the United States, which is the source of over 85% of private
health insurance coverage. Assessing whether individuals respond to the future price is empirically
challenging, which may explain why there has been relatively little work on this topic. The key
empirical diﬃculty arises because the spot price and the future price often vary jointly. A low
spending individual faces both a high spot price (because all his spending falls below the deductible)
and a high expected end-of-year price (because he does not expect to hit the deductible), while the
opposite is true for a high spending individual. Sim i l a r l y ,t h et y p e so fv a r i a t i o nt h a th a v em o s t
often been used to estimate the impact of health insurance on medical spending — such as variation
in deductibles or coinsurance rates — will change the spot price and the future price jointly. This
makes it challenging to identify whether individuals respond to the future price without a tightly
speciﬁed model of expectation formation, which in turn raises concerns about the extent to which
any elasticity estimates are driven by these modeling assumptions.
The primary empirical exercise in this paper addresses this challenge by identifying situations
in which individuals face the same spot price for their consumption decision, but have substantially
diﬀerent expected end-of-year prices. The key insight behind our empirical strategy is that, as a
result of certain institutional features of employer-provided health insurance in the United States,
individuals who join the same deductible plan in diﬀerent months of the year initially face the same
spot price, but diﬀerent expected end-of-year prices. Employer-provided health insurance resets
every year, typically on January 1. When new employees join a ﬁrm in the middle of the year,
they obtain coverage for the remainder of the year. While their premiums are pro-rated, deductible
amounts are ﬁxed at their annual level. As a result, all else equal, the expected end-of-year price
is increasing with the join month over the calendar year; individuals who join a plan later in the
year have fewer months to spend past the deductible.
We use this feature in order to test for forward looking behavior in the response to health
insurance contracts. In other words, we test the null of completely myopic behavior, which we
deﬁne as consumption decisions that depend only on the spot price. We do so by comparing
initial medical utilization across individuals who join the same plan in diﬀerent months of the year.
If individuals are forward looking in their healthcare consumption decisions, an individual who
joins the plan earlier in the calendar year should (initially) spend more than an otherwise identical
individual who joins the same plan later in the calendar year. By contrast, if individuals are myopic,
the initial spending of an individual who joins the plan earlier should be the same as the initial
spending of the individual who joins the same plan later. To account for potential confounders,
such as seasonality in healthcare spending, we use patterns of initial utilization by join month for
2individuals who join no-deductible plans, in which the future price hardly varies over the course of
the year. To operationalize this strategy empirically, we draw on data from several large employers
with information on their plan details as well as their employees’ plan choices, demographics, and
medical claims.
We note that individuals may fail to exhibit forward-looking behavior not only because they are
myopic but also if they are liquidity constrained or lack an understanding of their future budget
constraint. If we had failed to reject the null of completely myopic behavior, we would have
been unable to distinguish which of these factors was behind our result. In practice, however, we
reject the null and estimate that conditional on the spot price of medical care, individuals who
face a higher future price consume statistically signiﬁcantly less (initial) medical care. It therefore
appears that individuals understand something about the nature of their dynamic budget constraint
and make their healthcare consumption decisions wi t ha tl e a s ts o m ea t t e n t i o nt of o r w a r d - l o o k i n g
considerations.
In the last section of the paper we attempt to move beyond testing the null of complete myopia
and toward quantifying the extent of forward looking behavior. We estimate that a ten cent
increase in the future price (for a dollar of medical spending) is associated with a 6 to 8 percent
decline in initial medical utilization. This implies an elasticity of initial medical utilization with
respect to the future price of −04 to −06. To provide an economic interpretation of this estimate,
we develop a stylized dynamic model in which utilization behavior in response to medical shocks
depends on both the underlying willingness to substitute between health and residual income and
the degree of forward looking behavior. We draw on additional data from the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment to calibrate the model, and use the calibrated model to assess the extent of
forward looking behavior implied by our estimates of the response of initial medical utilization to the
future price. On the spectrum between full myopia (individuals respond only to the spot price) and
textbook forward looking behavior (individuals respond only to the future price), our calibration
results generally suggest that individuals’ behavior is much closer to the former. Nonetheless, we
illustrate that the degree of forward looking behavior we ﬁnd still has a substantial eﬀect on the
response of annual medical spending to health insurance contracts relative to the spending response
that would be predicted under either completely myopic or completely forward looking behavior.
Thus, failing to account for dynamic considerations can greatly alter the predicted impact of non-
linear health insurance contracts on annual medical expenditures.
Our paper links to the large empirical literature that tries to estimate moral hazard in health
insurance, or the price sensitivity of demand for medical care. As already mentioned, much of this
literature tries to estimate a demand elasticity with respect to a single price,2 although diﬀerent
studies consider a diﬀerent “relevant” price to which individuals are assumed to respond. For
example, the famous RAND elasticity of −02 is calculated assuming individuals respond only to
the spot price (Manning et al., 1987; Keeler and Rolph, 1988; Zweifel and Manning, 2000), while
more recent estimates have assumed that individuals respond only to the expected end-of-year
2See Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2007) for a recent review of this literature and its estimates.
3price (Eichner, 1997) or to the actual (realized) end-of-year price (Eichner, 1998; Kowalski, 2010).
Our ﬁndings highlight the importance of thinking about the entire budget set rather than about a
single price; this point was emphasized in some of the early theoretical work on the impact of health
insurance on health spending (Keeler, Newhouse, and Phelps, 1977; Ellis, 1986) but until recently
has rarely been incorporated into empirical work. Several papers on the impact of health insurance
on medical spending — Ellis (1986), Cardon and Hendel (2001), and more recently Kowalski (2011),
Marsh (2011), and our own work (Einav et al., 2011) — explicitly account for the non-linear budget
set, but a (fully forward-looking) behavioral model is assumed, rather than tested.3
Outside of the context of health insurance, a handful of papers address the question of whether
individuals respond at all to the non-linearities in their budget set, and which single price may best
approximate the non-linear schedule to which individuals respond. This is the focus of Liebman and
Zeckhauser (2004), Feldman and Katuscak (2006), and Saez (2010) in the context of the response
of labor supply to the progressive income tax schedule, and of Borenstein (2009) and Ito (2010) in
the context of residential electricity utilization. In most of these other contexts, as well as in our
own previous work on moral hazard in health insurance (Einav et al., 2011), the analysis of demand
in the presence of a non-linear pricing schedule is static. This is partly because in most non-health
contexts information about intermediate utilization levels (within the billing or tax cycle) is not
easy to obtain (for both consumers and researchers) and partly because dynamic modeling often
introduces unnecessary complications in the analysis. In this sense, our current study — utilizing
the precise timing of medical utilization within the contract year — is virtually unique within this
literature in its explicit focus on the dynamic aspect of medical utilization, and its explicit account
of expectation formation.4
Forward looking decision making plays a key role in many economic problems, and interest in
the extent of forward looking behavior is therefore quite general. From this perspective, a closely
related work to ours is Chevalier and Goolsbee’s (2009) investigation of whether durable goods
consumers are forward looking in their demand for college textbooks (they ﬁnd that they are).
Despite the obvious diﬀerence in context, their empirical strategy is similar to ours. They use the
fact that static, spot incentives remain roughly constant (as pricing of textbook editions doesn’t
change much until the arrival of new editions), while dynamic incentives (the expected time until
a new edition is released) change. A slightly cleaner aspect of our setting is that the constant spot
prices and varying dynamic incentives are explicitly stipulated in the coverage contract rather than
empirical facts that need to be estimated from data.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sketches a simple, stylized model of medical
care utilization that is designed to provide intuition for the key concepts and our empirical strategy;
3Non-linear pricing schedules are not unique to health insurance. Indeed, a large literature, going back at least
to Hausman (1985), develops methods that address the diﬃculties that arise in modeling selection and utilization
under non-linear budget sets, and applies these methods to other setting in which similar non-linearities are common,
such as labor supply (Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Chetty et al., 2011), electricity
utilization (Reiss and White, 2005), or cellular phones (Grubb and Osborne, 2009; Yao et al., 2011).
4An exception in this regard is Keeler and Rolph (1988), who, like us, test for forward looking behavior in health
insurance contracts (but use a diﬀerent empirical strategy and reach a diﬀerent conclusion).
4the model serves as both a guide to some of our subsequent empirical choices, and as a framework
that we use to benchmark the extent of forward looking behavior we estimate. In Section 3 we test
for forward looking behavior. We start by describing the basic idea and the data we obtained to
implement it, and then present the results. In Section 4 we calibrate the model from Section 2 to
try to quantify the extent to which individuals are forward looking. Section 5 concludes.
2A s i m p l e m o d e l
Consider a model of a risk-neutral forward-looking individual who faces uncertain medical expendi-
ture, and is covered by a contract of (discrete) length  and deductible .5 That is, the individual
pays all his expenditures out of pocket up to the deductible level , but any additional expenditure
is fully covered by the insurance provider.
The individual’s utility is linear and additive in health and residual income, and we assume
that medical events that are not treated are cumulative and additively separable in their eﬀect on
health. Medical events are given by a pair (),w h e r e0 denotes the total expenditure (paid
by either the individual or his insurance provider) required to treat the event, and 0 denotes
the (monetized) health consequences of the event if left untreated. We assume that individuals
need to make a discrete choice whether to fully treat an event or not; events cannot be partially
treated. We also assume that treated events are “fully” cured, and do not carry any other health




−           
(1)
where {} is the out-of-pocket cost associated with expenditure level , which is a function
of , the amount left to satisfy the deductible.
Medical shocks arrive with a per-period probability , and when they arrive they are drawn
independently from a distribution (). Given this setting, the only choice individuals make is
whether to treat or not treat each realized medical event. Optimal behavior can be characterized
by a simple ﬁnite horizon dynamic problem. The two state variables are the time left until the
end of the coverage period which we denote by , and the amount left until the entire deductible is
spent which we denote by . The value function () represents the present discounted value of
expected utility along the optimal treatment path. Speciﬁcally, the value function is given by the





−{} + ({ − 0}− 1)
− + ( − 1)
)
() (2)
5Assuming risk neutrality in the context of an insurance market may appear an odd modeling choice. Yet, it
makes the model simpler and more tractable and makes no diﬀerence for any of the qualitative insights we derive
from the model.
5with terminal conditions of (0) = 0 for all . If a medical event arrives, the individual treats the
e v e n ti ft h ev a l u ef r o mt r e a t i n g ,−{}+({−0}−1), exceeds the value obtained
from not treating, − + ( − 1).
The model implies simple and intuitive comparative statics: the treatment of a medical event is
more likely when the time left on the contract, , is higher and the amount left until the deductible
is spent, , is lower. This setting nests a range of possible behaviors. For example, “fully” myopic
individuals ( =0 ) would not treat any shock as long as the immediate negative health consequences
of the untreated shock, , are less than the immediate out-of-pocket expenditure costs associated
with treating that shock, min{}.T h u s ,i f , fully myopic individuals ( =0 ) will not treat if
 . By contrast, “fully” forward looking individuals ( ≈ 1) will not treat shocks if the adverse
health consequences, , are less than the expected end-of-year cost of treating this illness, which is
given by ·,w h e r e(for “future price”) denotes the expected end-of-year price of medical care,
which is the relevant price for a “fully” forward looking individual in deciding whether to consume
care today. Thus, if  , fully forward looking individuals will not treat if  · .T h a ti s ,
while fully myopic individuals consider the current, “spot”, or nominal price of care (which in our
example is equal to one), fully forward looking individuals only care about the future price.
To illustrate the implications of the model that will serve as the basis of our empirical strategy,
we solve the model for a simple case, where we assume that  =0 2 and that medical events are
drawn uniformly from a two-point support of ( =5 0  = 50) and ( =5 0  = 45).W e u s e
two diﬀerent deductible levels (of 600 and 800) and up to 52 periods (weeks) of coverage. Figure 1
presents some of the model’s implications for the case of  =1 . It uses metrics that are analogous
to the empirical objects we later use in the empirical exercise. The top panel presents the expected
end-of-year price of the individual as we change the deductible level and the coverage horizon.
The expected end-of-year price in this example is 1 − Pr(),w h e r ePr() is the fraction of
individuals who hit the deductible by the end of the year. Individuals are, of course, more likely
to hit the deductible as they have more time to do so or as the deductible level is lower. This
ex-ante probability of hitting the deductible determines the individual’s expectations about his
end-of-year price. This future price in turn aﬀects a forward looking individual’s willingness to
treat medical events. The bottom panel of Figure 1 presents the (cumulative) expected spending
over the initial three months (12 weeks). Given the speciﬁc choice of parameter values, expected
spending over the initial 12 periods is at least 60 (due to the per-period 0.1 probability of a medical
event ( =5 0  =5 0 )that would always be treated) and at most 120 (if all medical events are
treated).
The key comparative static that is illustrated by Figure 1 — and that will form the basis of our
empirical work — is how the expected end-of-year price (and hence initial spending by a forward
looking individual) varies with the coverage horizon. For a given deductible, the expected end-
of-year price is increasing as the coverage horizon declines (top panel of Figure 1) and therefore,
for a forward looking individual, expected initial spending also declines as the coverage horizon
declines (bottom panel of Figure 1). Speciﬁcally, when the coverage horizon is long enough and
the deductible level low enough, forward looking individuals expect to eventually hit the deductible
6and therefore treat all events, so expected spending is 120. However, as the horizon gets shorter
there is a greater possibility that the deductible would not get exhausted by the end of the year,
so the end-of-year price could be 1 (rather than zero), thus making forward looking individuals not
treat the less severe medical events of ( =5 0 = 45).
The graphs also illustrate how the spot price of current medical care misses a great deal of
the incentives faced by a forward looking individual. In the bottom panel of Figure 1 we see a
fully forward looking individual’s initial medical utilization (i.e., spending in the ﬁrst 12 weeks)
varying greatly with the coverage horizon despite a spot price that is always one. By contrast,
for the cases we consider, a fully myopic individual ( =0 ) who only responds to the spot price
has expected 12-week spending of 60, regardless of the coverage horizon  (see bottom panel).6
Likewise, the expected three-month spending of individuals in a no-deductible plan does not vary
with the coverage horizon, regardless of their , since the expected end-of-year price does not vary
with the coverage horizon.
F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a tw h i l ew eh a v er e f e r r e dt o as a measure of how “forward looking” the
individual is, in practice a variety of diﬀerent factors can push  below 1 and induce a behavioral
response to the current, “spot” price. These factors include not only myopia but also liquidity con-
straints (e.g., Adams, Einav, and Levin, 2009) and salience (e.g., Chetty and Saez, 2009; Liebman
and Luttmer, 2011). Our research strategy does not distinguish between these, nor is it necessary
to do so for predicting how spending will respond to changes in a non-linear budget set. However,
these diﬀerent sources that may aﬀect behavior can be important for forecasting the eﬀects of al-
ternative public policy interventions or for extrapolating our results to alternative populations. We
return to these issues brieﬂyi nt h ec o n c l u s i o n s .
3 Testing for forward looking behavior
3.1 Basic idea
To test whether individuals exhibit forward looking behavior in their behavioral response to their
health insurance contract, we design a test for whether individuals respond to the future price of
medical consumption in a setting in which similar individuals face the same spot price (i.e., the
nominal price at the time they make their medical consumption decision) but diﬀerent future prices.
In such a situation, we can test whether medical utilization changes with the future price, holding
the spot price ﬁxed, and interpret a non-zero coeﬃcient as evidence of forward looking behavior
and as a rejection of the null of complete myopia.
The central empirical challenge therefore is to identify individuals who face the same spot price
but diﬀerent future prices for medical consumption. Our novel observation is that the institutional
6A fully myopic individual ( =0 )would (like the fully forward looking individual) always treat ( =5 0 =5 0 )
shocks but as long as he is still in the deductible range would never treat ( =5 0  =4 5 )shocks. Given this
behavior, with a 600 or 800 deductible, there is a zero probability that the deductible would be reached within the
ﬁrst 12 weeks.
7features of employer-provided health insurance in the United States provide such variation. Specif-
ically, we use the fact that unlike other lines of private insurance (e.g., auto insurance or home
insurance), the coverage period of employer-provided health insurance is not customized to individ-
ual employees. This presumably reﬂects the need for synchronization within the company, such as
beneﬁts sessions, open enrollment periods, and tax treatment. Therefore, (annual) coverage begins
(and ends, unless it is terminated due to job separation) at the same date — typically on January 1 —
for almost all employees. Although all employees can choose to join a new plan for the subsequent
year during the open enrollment period (typically in October or November), there are only two
reasons employees can join a plan in the middle of the year: either they are new hires or they have
a qualifying event that allows them to change plans in the middle of the year.7 In order to transition
new employees (and occasionally existing employees who have a qualifying event) into the regular
cycle, the common practice is to let employees choose from the regular menu of coverage options,
to pro-rate linearly the annual premium associated with their choices, but to maintain constant (at
its annual level) the deductible amount. As a result, individuals who are hired at diﬀerent points
in the year, but are covered by the same (deductible) plan, face the same spot price (of one) but
diﬀerent future prices. Thus, as long as employees join the company at diﬀerent times for reasons
that are exogenous to their medical utilization behavior, variation in hire date (or in the timing of
qualifying events) generates quasi-experimental variation in the future price that allows us to test
for forward looking behavior.
To illustrate, consider two identical employees who select a plan with an $800 (annual) de-
ductible. The ﬁrst individual is hired by the company in January and the second in July. The
diﬀerence in their incentives is analogous to the simple model presented in Figure 1. Individuals
w h oj o i ni nal a t e rm o n t hd u r i n gt h ey e ar have a shorter coverage horizon  until coverage resets (on
January 1). Individuals who join early in the year have a longer coverage horizon. The early joiners
are therefore more likely to hit their deductible by the time their coverage resets. Therefore, as in
the top panel of Figure 1, early joiners have a lower expected end-of-year price. As in the bottom
panel of Figure 1, if individuals are forward looking, then early joiners have a greater incentive
to utilize medical care upon joining the plan. Crucially, just after they get hired, both January
and July joiners have yet to hit their deductible, so their spot price is (at least initially) the same.
Thus, diﬀerences in (initial) spending cannot be attributed to diﬀerences in spot prices, and there-
fore must reﬂect dynamic considerations. By contrast, as Figure 1 also illustrates, if individuals are
completely myopic (or join a plan with no deductible so that the expected end-of-year price does
not vary with the month they join the plan), initial utilization will not vary for the early and later
joiners.
7Qualifying events include marriage, divorce, birth or adoption of a child, a spouse’s loss of employment, or death
of a dependent.
83.2 Data
Data construction With this strategy in mind, we obtained claim-level data on employer-
provided health insurance in the United States. We limited our sample to ﬁrms that oﬀered at
least one plan with a deductible (which would generate variation in expected end-of-year price
based on the employee’s join month, as in the top panel of Figure 1) and at least one plan with no
deductible. The relationship between initial utilization and join month in the no-deductible plan
is used to try to control for other potential confounding patterns in initial medical utilization by
join month (such as seasonal ﬂu); in a typical no-deductible plan, the expected end-of-year price is
roughly constant by join month, so — absent confounding eﬀects that vary by join month — initial
medical utilization of employees covered by a no-deductible plan should not systematically vary
with join month (bottom panel of Figure 1).
The data come from two sources. The ﬁrst is Alcoa, Inc., a large multinational producer of
aluminum and related products. We have four years of data (2004-2007) on the health insurance
options, choices, and medical insurance claims of its employees (and any insured dependents) in
the United States. We study the two most common health insurance plans at Alcoa, one with
a deductible for in-network expenditure of $250 for single coverage ($500 for family coverage),
and one with no deductible associated with in-network spending. While Alcoa employed (and
the data cover) about 45,000 U.S.-based individuals every year, the key variation we use in this
paper is driven by mid-year plan enrollment by individuals not previously insured by the ﬁrm, thus
restricting our analysis to only about 7,000 unique employees (over the four years) that meet our
sample criteria.8 Of the employees at Alcoa who join a plan mid-year and did not previously have
insurance at Alcoa that year, about 80% are new hires, while the other 20% are employees who
were at Alcoa but uninsured at the ﬁrm, had a qualifying event that allowed them to change plans
in the middle of the year, and chose to switch to Alcoa-provided insurance.
The Alcoa data are almost ideal for our purposes, with the important exception of sample
size. Ex ante, sample size was a key concern given the large variation in medical spending across
individuals. To increase statistical power we examined the set of ﬁrms (and plans) available through
the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) ﬁles of Medstat’s MarketScan database. The
data on plan choices and medical spending are virtually identical in nature and structure across
the three ﬁrms (indeed, Alcoa administers its health insurance claims via Medstat); they include
coverage and claim-level information from an employer-provided health insurance context, provided
by a set of (anonymous) large employers.
We selected two ﬁrms that satisﬁed our basic criteria of being relatively large and oﬀering both
deductible and no-deductible options to their employees. Each ﬁrm has about 60,000 employees
who join one of these plans in the middle of the year over the approximately six years of our data.
This substantially larger sample size is a critical advantage over the Alcoa data. The disadvantages
of these data are that we cannot tell apart new hires from existing employees who are new to
8We restrict our analysis to employees who are not insured at the ﬁrm prior to joining a plan in the middle of the
year because if individuals change plans within the ﬁrm (due to a qualifying event), the deductible would not reset.
9the ﬁrm’s health coverage (presumably due to qualifying events that allow them to join a health
insurance plan in the middle of the year), we cannot distinguish between in-network and out-of-
network spending, there is less demographic information on the employees, and the coinsurance
rate for one of the plans in one of the ﬁrms is not known.
Because employers in MarketScan are anonymous (and we essentially know nothing about them),
we will refer to these two additional employers as ﬁrm B and ﬁr mC .W ef o c u so nt w op l a n so ﬀered
by ﬁrm B. We have ﬁve years of data (2001-2005) for these plans, during which ﬁrm B oﬀered one
plan with no in-network deductible and one plan that had a $150 ($300) in-network single (family)
deductible. The data for ﬁrm C are similar, except that the features of the deductible plan have
c h a n g e ds l i g h t l yo v e rt i m e .W eh a v es e v e ny e a r so fd a t af o rﬁrm C (1999-2005), during which the
ﬁrm continuously oﬀered a no-deductible plan (in-network) alongside a plan with a deductible. The
deductible amount increased over time, with a single (family) in-network deductible of $200 ($500)
during 1999 and 2000, of $250 ($625) during 2001 and 2002, and $300 ($750) during 2004 and 2005.
Table 1 summarizes the key features of the plans (and their enrollment) that are covered by
our ﬁnal data set. In all three ﬁrms, we limit our analysis to employees who join a plan between
February and October, and who did not have insurance at the ﬁrm immediately prior to this
join date. We omit employees who join in January for reasons related to the way the data are
organized that make it diﬃcult to tell apart new hires who join the ﬁrm in January from existing
employees. We omit employees who join in November or December because, as we discuss in more
detail below, we use data from the ﬁrst three months after enrollment to construct our measures of
“initial” medical utilization. Table 1 also summarizes, by plan, the limited demographic information
we observe on each covered employee, namely the type of coverage they chose (family or single),
and the employee’s gender, age, and enrollment month.9
Measuring the expected end-of-year price Table 2 describes the key variation we use in our
empirical analysis. For each plan, we report the expected end-of-year price as a function of the
time within the year an employee joined the plan.10 Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the expected end-of-year
price, or future price, ,a s
 =1− Pr() (3)
where Pr() is the probability an employee who joins plan  in month  will hit (i.e., spend
more than) the in-network deductible by the end of the year; we calculate Pr() as the fraction
of employees in a given plan and join month who have spent more than the in-network deductible
by the end of the year.11 For example, consider a plan with a $500 deductible and full coverage
9In each ﬁrm we lose roughly 15 to 30 percent of new plan joiners because of some combination of missing
information about the employee’s plan, missing plan details, or missing claims data (because the plan is an HMO or
a partially or fully capitated POS plan).
10In this and all subsequent analyses we pool the three diﬀerent deductible plans in ﬁrm C which were oﬀered at
diﬀerent times over our sample period.
11We calculate Pr() separately for employees with individual and family coverage (since both the deductible
amount and spending patterns vary with the coverage tier), and therefore in all of our analyses  varies with
10for any medical expenditures beyond the deductible. If 80% of the employees who joined the plan
in February have hit the deductible by the end of the year, the expected end-of-year price would
be 08 · 0+0 2 · 1=0 2. If only 40% of the employees who joined the plan in August have hit the
deductible by the end of the year, their expected end-of-year price would be 04 · 0+0 6 · 1=0 6.
Thus, the future price is the average (out-of-pocket) end-of-year price of an extra dollar of in-
network spending. It is a function of one’s plan , join month , and the annual spending of all
the employees in one’s plan and join month.
Table 2 summarizes the average future price for each plan based on the quarter of the year
in which one joins the plan. For plans with no deductible (0, 0,a n d0), the future price is
mechanically zero (since everyone “hits” the zero deductible), regardless of the join month. For
deductible plans, however, the future price varies with the join month. Only a small fraction of
the individuals who join plans late in the year (August through October) hit their deductible, so
their future price is greater than 0.8 on average. In contrast, many more employees who join a
deductible plan early in the year (February to April) hit their deductible, so for such employees the
future price is just over 0.5. Thus, early joiners who select plans with a deductible face an average
end-of-year price that is about 30 percentage points lower than the end-of-year price faced by late
joiners. Yet, initially (just after they join) both types of employees have yet to hit their deductible,
so they all face a spot price of one. Diﬀerences in initial spending between the groups therefore
plausibly reﬂects their dynamic response to the future price. This baseline deﬁnition of the future
price — the fraction of employees who join a given plan in a given month whose spending does not
exceed the in-network deductible by the end of the calendar year — will be used as the key right
hand variable in much of our subsequent empirical work.
Our baseline measure of the future price abstracts from several additional characteristics of the
plans, which are summarized in Appendix Table A1. First, it ignores any coinsurance features of
the plans. Plans A0, A1, and C1-C3 all have a 10% coinsurance rate, while plans B0 and C0 have
a zero coinsurance rate. The coinsurance rate for plan B1 is unknown (to us). Second, we use only
the in-network plan features and assume that all spending occurs in network. In practice, each
plan (including the no-deductible plan) has deductibles and higher consumer coinsurance rates for
medical spending that occurs out of network.
There are two consequences of these abstractions, both of which bias any estimated impact
of the future price on behavior toward zero. First, abstracting from these features introduces
measurement error into the future price. Second, our analysis assumes that for the no-deductible
plans there is no variation in the future price for employees who join in diﬀerent months (i.e.,
the spot price and the future price are always the same). In practice, both a positive in-network
coinsurance rate (prior to the stop-loss) and the existence of out-of-network deductibles in all of
the no-deductible (in-network) plans mean that the future price also increases with the join month
for employees in the no-deductible plans. In the robustness section below we show that accounting
for these additional features — to the extent we are able to — makes little quantitative diﬀerence to
coverage tier. However, for conciseness, in the tables we pool coverage tiers and report the (weighted) average across
coverage tiers within each plan.
11either our measurement of the future price or its estimated eﬀect.
A ﬁnal point worth noting about our deﬁnition of the future price is that it is constructed based
on the observed spending patterns of people who join a speciﬁc plan (and coverage tier) in a speciﬁc
month. For forward looking individuals, this spending may of course be inﬂuenced by the future
price. As we discuss in more detail below, this is not a problem for testing the null of complete
myopia (because under this null spending is not aﬀected by the future price). Yet, for quantifying
the extent of forward looking behavior in Section 4 we will implement an instrumental variable
strategy designed to purge the calculated future price of any endogenous spending response.
3.3 Estimating equations and results
Patterns of initial utilization by plan and join month We proxy for “initial” utilization
with two alternative measures. The ﬁrst is a measure of the time (in days) to the ﬁrst claim, while
the second is a measure of total spending (in dollars) over some initial duration (we will use three
months). In both cases, the measures of utilization encompass the utilization of the employee and
any covered dependents.
Average three month spending in our sample is about $600. It is zero for about 42% of the
sample. Since time to ﬁrst claim is censored at as low a value as 92 days (for individuals who join
in October), we censor time to ﬁrst claim at 92 for all the individuals (regardless of join month)
who have their ﬁrst claim more than 92 days after joining the ﬁrm’s coverage. The average time to
ﬁrst claim for the remaining 58% of the individuals is 35 days, so with 42% of the sample censored
at 92 days, the sample average for the censored variable is 58 days.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for these measures of initial medical utilization by join month
for each plan. These statistics already indicate what appears to be a response to dynamic incentives.
For the no-deductible plans the average initial spending (left panel) and time to ﬁrst claim (right
panel) are somewhat noisy, but do not reveal any systematic relationship with join month. By
contrast, employees who are in deductible plans appear to spend substantially less within the ﬁrst
three months after joining the plan, or have a substantially longer time to ﬁrst claim, if they join
the plan later in the year, presumably due to dynamic considerations. As illustrated in the bottom
panel of Figure 1, this is exactly the qualitative pattern one would expect from forward looking
individuals.
We operationalize this analysis a little more formally by regressing the measures of initial
utilization on join month. A unit of observation is an employee  who joins health insurance plan
 during calendar month . As mentioned, we limit attention to employees who join new plans
between February and October, so  ∈ {210}. The simplest way by which we can implement
our strategy is to look within a given health plan that has a positive deductible associated with it
and regress a measure of initial medical utilization  on the join month  and possibly a set of
controls ,s ot h a t :
 =  + 0
 +  (4)
Absent any confounding inﬂuences of join month on , we would expect an estimate of  =0
12for deductible plans if individuals are fully myopic ( =0 )a n d  0 for spending (  0 for
time to ﬁrst claim) if individuals are not (0). We include an additional covariate for whether
the employee has family (as opposed to single) coverage to account for the fact that the deductible
v a r i e sw i t h i nap l a nb yc o v e r a g et i e r( s e eT a b l e1 )a n dt h a tt h e r en a t u r a l l ye x i s tl a r g ed i ﬀerences
in average medical utilization in family vs. single coverage plans.
For our analysis of initial spending, our baseline dependent variable is log( +1 ) ,w h e r e is
total medical spending (in dollars) by the employee and any covered dependents during their ﬁrst
three months in the plan. Given that medical utilization is highly skewed, the log transformation
helps in improving precision and reducing the eﬀect of outliers.12 An added attraction of the log
speciﬁcation is that it facilitates comparison of the results to those from our analysis of time to
ﬁrst claim. For the latter analysis, we use a Tobit speciﬁcation on log(),w h e r e measures
t h et i m et oﬁrst claim (in days) by the employee and any covered dependents; the Tobit is used to
account for the censoring at 92 days described above. We explore alternative functional forms for
both dependent variables below.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4 report results from estimating equation (4) on these two de-
pendent variables, separately for each plan. The key right-hand-side variable is the join month,
enumerated from 2 (February) to 10 (October). In plans that have a deductible (1, 1,a n d1-
3), dynamic considerations would imply a negative relationship between join month and initial
spending and positive relationship between join month and time to ﬁrst claim. The results show
exactly this qualitative pattern.
Patterns of initial utilization by join month for deductible vs. no-deductible plan If
seasonality in medical utilization is an important factor, it could confound the interpretation of the
estimated relationship that we have just discussed as a test for the null of full myopia. For example,
if spending in the spring is greater than spending in the summer due to, say, seasonal ﬂu, then we
may incorrectly attribute the decline in “spot” utilization for late joiners as a response to dynamic
incentives. To address this concern (and other possible confounding diﬀerences across employees
who join plans at diﬀerent months of the year), we use as a control group employees within the
same ﬁrm who join the health insurance plan with no deductible in diﬀerent months. As discussed
earlier, such employees are in a plan in which the spot price and future price are (roughly) the
same so that changes in their initial utilization over the year (or lack thereof) provides a way to
measure and control for factors that inﬂuence initial utilization by join month that are unrelated
to dynamic incentives.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4, discussed earlier, also show the plan-level analysis of the
relationship between initial medical utilization and join month for the no-deductible plans (0, 0,
and 0). The coeﬃcient on join month for the no-deductible plans tends to be much smaller than
12While conceptually a concave transformation is therefore useful, we have no theoretical guidance as to the “right”
functional form; any transformation therefore (including the one we choose) is ad hoc, and we simply choose one that
is convenient and easy to implement. We note however that Box-Cox analysis of the  +1variable suggests that a
log transformation is appropriate.
13the coeﬃcient for the deductible plan in the same ﬁrm (and is often statistically indistinguishable
from zero). This suggests that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the pattern of spending by
join month in deductible plans relative to the analogous pattern in no-deductible plans will look very
similar to the patterns in the deductible plans. Indeed, this is what we ﬁnd, as reported in columns
(2) and (4) of Table 4, which report this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis in which the no-deductible
plan (within the same ﬁrm) is used to control for the seasonal pattern of initial utilization by join
month in the “absence” of dynamic incentives. Speciﬁcally, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation
is
 = 0 +  +  + 0
0 +  (5)
where  are plan ﬁxed eﬀects,  are join-month ﬁxed eﬀects, and  is a dummy variable that is
equal to one when  is a deductible plan. The “plan ﬁxed eﬀects” (the ’s) include separate ﬁxed
eﬀects for each plan by coverage tier (family or single) since the coverage tier aﬀects the deductible
amount (see Table 1). Again, our coeﬃcient of interest is 0,w h e r e0 =0would be consistent
with the lack of response to dynamic incentives (i.e., full myopia) while 0  0 (for spending; or
0  0 for time to ﬁrst claim) implies that the evidence is consistent with forward looking behavior.
Since we are now pooling results across plans (deductible and no-deductible plans), the parameter
of interest 0 no longer has a  subscript.
The results in Table 4 indicate that, except at Alcoa where we have much smaller sample sizes,
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates for each ﬁrm are all statistically signiﬁc a n ta n dw i t ht h es i g n
that is consistent with dynamic considerations. For example, in Firm B we ﬁnd that enrollment a
month later in a plan with a ($150 or $300) deductible relative to enrollment a month later in a
plan with no deductible is associated with an 8% decline in medical expenditure during the ﬁrst
three months, and a 3% increase in the time to ﬁrst claim. In Firm C these numbers are a 2%
decline and a 2% increase, respectively.
Of course, employees who self select into a no-deductible plan are likely to be sicker and to
utilize medical care more frequently than those employees who select plans with a deductible (due
to both selection and moral hazard eﬀects). Indeed, Table 1 shows that there are, not surprisingly,
some observable diﬀerences between employees within a ﬁrm who choose the no-deductible option
instead of the deductible option. Our key identifying assumption is that while initial medical
utilization may diﬀer on average between employees who join deductible plans and those who join
no-deductible plans, the within-year pattern of initial utilization by join month does not vary based
on whether the employee joined the deductible or no-deductible plan except for dynamic incentives.
In other words, we assume that any diﬀerences in initial utilization between those who join the no-
deductible plan and the deductible plan within a ﬁrm can be controlled for by a single (join month
invariant) dummy variable. We return to this below, when we discuss possible threats to this
identifying assumption and attempt to examine its validity.
Testing the relationship between expected end-of-year price and initial utilization In
order to provide an economic interpretation to the parameter of interest, it is useful to convert
the key right-hand-side variable, join month (), into a variable that is closer to the underlying
14object of interest: the expected end-of-year price. We therefore start by analyzing variants of the
single-plan analysis (equation (4)) and the diﬀerence-in diﬀerence analysis (equation (5)) in which
we replace the join month variable () with the future price variable  deﬁned earlier (recall
equation (3) for a deﬁnition, and Table 2 for summary statistics). The estimating equations are
thus modiﬁed to
 = e  + 0
e  + e  (6)
and
 = e 
0
 + e  + e  + 0
e 0 + e  (7)
where (as before) e are plan (by coverage tier) ﬁxed eﬀects, and e  are join-month ﬁxed eﬀects.
This transformation also aids in addressing the likely non-linear eﬀe c to fj o i nm o n t ho nb o t h
expected end-of-year price and on expected spending. Figure 1 illustrates how this relationship
may be non-linear, and Table 2 indicates that, indeed, our measure of the end-of-year price varies
non-linearly over time.
Table 5 reports the results. The ﬁrst three rows report the results for each ﬁrm. We report the
results for the deductible plan in each ﬁrm in columns (1) and (3) and the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
results that use the deductible and no-deductible plan within each ﬁrm in columns (2) and (4).13
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence results in Firm B and Firm C (where the sample sizes are much bigger)
suggest that a 10 cent increase in the expected end-of-year price is associated with an 8 to 17
percent reduction in initial medical spending and with a 2.5 to 7 percent increase in the time to
ﬁrst claim. These results are almost always statistically signiﬁcant.
Thus far, all of the analysis has been of single plans or pairs of plans within a ﬁrm. The use of
future price (rather than join month) also allows us to more sensibly pool results across ﬁrms and
summarize them with a single number, since the relationship between join month and future price
will vary both with the level of the deductible (see Figure 1) and with the employee population.
In pooling the data, however, we continue to rely on only within ﬁrm variation, since we know
little about the diﬀerent ﬁrms or about how comparable (or not) their employee populations are
(although we show in the appendix that in practice this does not make a substantive diﬀerence
to the results). Thus, our ﬁnal speciﬁcation allows the join month dummy variables e ’s to vary
by ﬁrm, so that all of the identiﬁcation is coming from the diﬀerential eﬀect of the join month on
employees in deductible plans relative to no-deductible plans within the same ﬁrm. That is, we
estimate
 = e e 
0
 + e e  + e e  + 0
e e 
0
+ e e  (8)
where e e  denotes a full set of join month by ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The bottom rows of Table 5 reports
the results from this regression. The OLS results (penultimate row of Table 5) will represent our
baseline speciﬁcation in the rest of this section. We defer discussion of the IV results (last row of
Table 5) to the next section.
13Note that, by design,  is constant for no-deductible plans, so that we cannot estimate the single-plan analysis
of the relationship between initial medical utilization and future price for the no-deductible plans.
15The eﬀect of future price is statistically signiﬁcant for both dependent variables. The OLS
results in the penultimate row indicate that an increase of 10 cents in the future price is associated
with an 11% decline in initial medical spending and a 3.6% increase in time to ﬁrst claim. Overall,
the results suggest that we can reject the null of complete myopia ( =0 ). Individuals appear to
respond to the future price of medical care in making current medical care utilization decisions.
In other words, among individuals who face the same spot price of medical care, individuals who
face a higher expected end-of-year price — because they join the plan later in the year — initially
consume less medical care.
We also investigated the margin on which the individual’s response to the future price oc-
curs. About three quarters of medical expenditures in our data represent outpatient spending;
per episode, inpatient care is more expensive and perhaps less discretionary than outpatient care.
Perhaps not surprisingly therefore, we ﬁnd clear evidence of a response of outpatient spending to
the future price, but we are unable to reject the null of no response of inpatient spending to the
future price (although the point estimates are of the expected sign); Appendix Table A2 contains
the results.
Robustness We explored the robustness of our results to a number of our modeling choices. The
ﬁr s ts i xr o w so fT a b l e6s h o w st h a to u rﬁnding is quite robust across alternative functional forms
for the dependent variable. The ﬁrst row shows the baseline results, where for initial spending the
dependent variable is log(+1),w h e r e is total medical spending in the three months after joining
the plan, and for time-to-ﬁr s t - c l a i mw ee s t i m a t eaT o b i tm o d e lf o rlog(),w h e r e is the
number of days until the ﬁrst claim, censored at 92.
Row (2) of Table 6 uses levels (rather than logs) of  and  (maintaining the Tobit speciﬁca-
tion for the  analysis). The statistically signiﬁcant estimates are comparable in magnitude to
those in the baseline speciﬁcation. Relative to the mean of the dependent variable, the results in
row (2) suggest that a 10 cent increase in the future price is associated with a 7% decline in initial
spending (compared to an 11% decline estimated in the baseline speciﬁcation), and a 2.5% increase
in the time to ﬁrst claim (compared to a 3.6% increase in the baseline). In row (3) we report
results from quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson estimation and calculate the fully-robust variance
covariance matrix (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 674-676); this is an alternative proportional model to
the log speciﬁcation, and one that allows us to incorporate the frequent occurrence of zero initial
spending without adding 1 when the dependent variable is based on three-month spending. The
estimate is still statistically signiﬁcant, although somewhat smaller than our baseline estimate for
initial spending (suggesting that a 10 cent increase in the future price is associated with a 7% rather
than 11% decline in initial spending).
The next three rows investigate alternative ways of handling the time to ﬁrst claim analysis.
Row (4) shows that estimating the baseline speciﬁcation by OLS instead of Tobit produces estimates
that are still statistically signiﬁcant but are somewhat smaller than the baseline (a 1.1% rather
than 3.6% increase in time to ﬁrst claim). Row (5) reports result from estimating a censored-normal
regression on our baseline dependent variable log(), which allows for the censoring value to
16vary across observations. This allows us to make use of the fact that while we only observe 92 days
of medical claims for individuals who join in October, we can expand the observation period for
individuals who join in earlier months. The advantage of such a speciﬁcation is that it makes use of
more information; the disadvantage is that it may not be as comparable to the spending estimates
since it implicitly gives more weight to individuals who join earlier in the year. The results are
virtually identical to the baseline speciﬁcation. In row (6) we estimate a Cox semi-parametric
proportional hazard model of the time to ﬁrst claim (censored at 92 days for all observations).14
Consistent with the previous speciﬁcations, the results indicate that an increase in the future price
is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant decline in the probability of a claim arrival (i.e., a longer
time to ﬁrst claim).
In Appendix Table A3 (Panels A and B) we further show the robustness of our results to
alternative choices of covariates regarding the ﬁrm and coverage tier ﬁxed eﬀects. We also explore
an alternative measure of the future price which, unlike our baseline measure, accounts for the in-
network coinsurance rates in both the deductible and no-deductible plans for the two ﬁrms in which
this information is available (Alcoa and Firm C; see Appendix Table A1). Accounting for the in-
network coinsurance rates for Alcoa and Firm C makes little diﬀerence to either our measurement
of the future price (Appendix Table A4) or its estimated eﬀect (Appendix Table A3, Panel C),
although the results in Appendix Table A3 suggest that, as expected (see discussion in Section
3.2), not accounting for the coinsurance rate slightly biases downward the estimated impact of the
future price in our baseline speciﬁcation.15
3.4 Assessing the identifying assumption
The results suggest that we can reject the null of complete myopia in favor of some form of forward
looking behavior. The key identifying assumption behind this interpretation of the results is that
there are no confounding diﬀerences in initial medical utilization among employees by their plan
and join month. In other words, any diﬀerential patterns of initial medical utilization that we
observe across plans by join month is caused by diﬀerences in expected end-of-year price. This
identifying assumption might not be correct if for some reason individuals who join a particular
plan in diﬀerent months vary in their underlying propensity to use medical care. In particular, one
might be concerned that the same forward looking behavior that may lead to diﬀerential medical
care utilization might also lead to diﬀerential selection into a deductible compared to a no-deductible
plan on the basis of join month.
14Van der Berg (2001) discusses the trade-oﬀsi n v o l v e di na n a l y z i n gad u r a t i o nm o d e lu s i n gal i n e a rm o d e lw i t h
the logarithm of the duration as the dependent variable, relative to a proportional hazard model. As he explains,
neither model strictly dominates the other.
15We do not observe the breakdown of spending by in-network vs. out-of-network in Firm B or Firm C, so we
cannot account for out-of-network spending in our construction of the future price at either of these ﬁrms. We do
know that in Alcoa, where the data allow us to tell apart in-network spending from out-of-network spending, about
95% of the spending is done in network. We therefore suspect that the accounting for out-of-network spending and
out-of-network features of the plan would have little quantitative impact on our estimates of either the future price
or the response to it.
17A priori, it is not clear if forward looking individuals would engage in diﬀerential selection into
a deductible vs. no-deductible plan based on the month they are joining the plan. A selection
story that would be most detrimental to the interpretation of our results is that individuals who
have high expected initial medical expenditure would be more likely to select the no-deductible
plan later in the year. For example, if an individual knows that all he needs is a single (urgent)
doctor’s appointment of $100 (which is below the deductible amount), it may be worth joining the
no-deductible plan (and paying the higher monthlyp r e m i u m )i fh ej o i n st h ep l a nl a t e ri nt h ey e a r
but not earlier in the year, as late in the year the incremental premium of a no-deductible plan is
lower and would be less than the $100 beneﬁts it would provide. This would introduce a positive
relationship between individuals who join the no-deductible plan in later months and initial medical
utilization and could cause us to erroneously interpret the lack of such a pattern in the deductible
plans as evidence that individuals respond to the future price.
On the other hand, there are many reasons to expect no selection, even in the context of forward
looking individuals, if there are additional choice or preference parameters governing insurance plan
selection that do not directly determine medical utilization. For example, if individuals anticipate
the apparently large switching costs associated with subsequent re-optimization of plan choice (as in
Handel, 2011) they might make their initial, mid-year plan choice based on their subsequent optimal
open enrollment selection for a complete year. In such a case, we would not expect diﬀerential
selection into plans by join month. Ultimately, whether there is quantitatively important diﬀerential
selection and its nature is an empirical question.
The summary statistics in Table 2 present some suggestive evidence that individuals may be
(slightly) more likely to select the deductible plan relative to the no-deductible plan later in the
year.16 Quantitatively, however, the probability of selecting the deductible vs. no-deductible plan
is very similar over the course of the year. When we regress an indicator variable for whether
the employee chose a deductible plan on the employee’s join month (enumerated, as before, from
2 to 10), together with a dummy variable for coverage tier and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to parallel our
main speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on join month is 0.0034 (standard error 0.0018). Qualitatively,
the pattern of greater probability of choosing a deductible later in the year is the opposite of
what could produce a confounding explanation for our main empirical results. More importantly,
quantitatively the results suggest trivial diﬀerential plan selection by join month; joining a month
later is associated with only a 0.3 percentage point increase in the probability of choosing the
deductible plan, or 0.9% relative to the 32% probability of choosing the deductible plan in the
sample. This very similar share of choices of deductible vs. no-deductible plans over the course of
the year implies that diﬀerential plan selection is unlikely to drive our ﬁndings.
We also examined whether the observable characteristics — i.e. age and gender — of individuals
joining a deductible vs. no-deductible plan within each of the three ﬁr m sv a r i e db yj o i nm o n t h .I n
general, the results (shown in Appendix Table A5) show little evidence of systematic diﬀerences
16Over the three join quarters shown in Table 2, the share joining the deductible plan varies in Alcoa from 0.49 to
0.53 to 0.53, in ﬁr mBf r o m0 . 2 0t o0 . 2 2t o0 . 1 9 ,a n di nﬁr mCf r o m0 . 3 8t o0 . 4 0t o0 . 4 4 .
18by join month.17 To examine whether our ﬁndings are sensitive to these observable diﬀerences, in
Row 7 of Table 6 we re-estimate our baseline speciﬁcation (equation (8)) adding controls for the
observable demographic characteristics of the employees: employee age, gender, and join year (see
Table 1). In keeping with the “within-ﬁrm” spirit of the entire analysis, we interact each of these
variables with the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. This speciﬁcation controls for potential observable diﬀerences
across employees within a ﬁrm by plan type and join month. The results indicate that the impact of
these controls is neither substantial nor systematic. The eﬀect of a 10 cent increase in the expected
end-of-year price on initial spending declines from 11% in the baseline speciﬁcation to 10% with
the demographic controls, while the eﬀect on time to ﬁrst claim increases from 3.6% in the baseline
speciﬁcation to 5.2% with the demographic controls. All the results remain statistically signiﬁcant.
As another potential way to investigate the validity of the identifying assumption, we implement
an imperfect “placebo test” by re-estimating our baseline speciﬁcation (equation (8)) with the
dependent variable as the “initial” medical utilization in the second year the employee is in the
plan. In other words, we continue to deﬁne “initial medical utilization” relative to the join month
(so that the calendar month in which we measure initial medical utilization varies in the same way
as in our baseline speciﬁcation across employees by join month) but we now measure it in the second
year the employee is in the plan. For example, for employees who joined the plan in July 2004, we
look at their medical spending during July through September 2005. In principle, when employees
are in the plan for a full year there should be no eﬀect of join month (of the previous year) on
their expected end-of-year price, and therefore no diﬀerence in “initial” utilization by join month
across the plans. In practice, the test suﬀers from the problem that the amount of medical care
consumed in the join year could inﬂuence (either positively or negatively) the amount consumed
in the second year, either because of inter-temporal substitution (which could generate negative
serial correlation) or because medical care creates demand for further care (e.g., follow up visits or
further tests), which could generate positive serial correlation.
Row (8) of Table 6 shows the baseline results limited to the approximately 60% of the employees
who remain at the ﬁrm for the entire second year. We continue to ﬁnd the same basic pattern
in this smaller sample although the point estimate declines (in absolute value) and the time to
ﬁrst claim results are no longer statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. For this subsample
of employees, row (9) shows the results when we now measure “initial medical spending” in the
same three months but in the second year.18 Here we ﬁnd that an increase in the future price is
associated with a much smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant decline in medical spending measured
over the same three month period but in the second year. We interpret this as generally supportive
17While there are two exceptions that show statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerential selection by join month, they are
both quantitatively trivial. Employees at Alcoa who join a deductible vs. no-deductible plan one month later in the
year are 0.9 percentage points (about 2%) more likely to be female. Employees at Firm B who join a deductible vs.
no-deductible plan one month later in the year are 0.6 percentage points (about 2%) less likely to be over 45 (or 0.2
months younger (not shown in the table)).
18We perform this “second year” analysis only for the dependent variable “initial medical spending” as it seemed
a w k w a r dt ou st oe x a m i n e“ t i m et oﬁrst claim” from an arbitrary starting point in the second year (when in fact the
individual has had prior months to make his ﬁrst claim).
19of the identifying assumption, and suggestive of positive serial correlation in medical spending.
Finally, in row (10) we investigate the extent to which the decrease in utilization in response to
a higher future price represents inter-temporal substitution of medical spending to the next year.
Such inter-temporal substitution would not be a threat to our empirical design — indeed, it might
be viewed as evidence of another form of forward-looking behavior in medical spending — but it
would aﬀect the interpretation of our estimates and is of interest in its own right. We therefore
re-run our baseline speciﬁcation but now with the dependent variables measured in January to
March of the second year. The results indicate that individuals who face a higher future price
(and therefore consume less medical care) also consume less medical care in the beginning of the
subsequent year. This suggests that inter-temporal substitution, in the form of postponement of
care to the subsequent calendar year, is unlikely to drive the decrease in care associated with a
higher future price.
4 Quantifying forward looking behavior
Our results thus far have rejected the null of no response to the future price and presented evidence
consistent with some form of forward looking behavior. A natural subsequent question is to ask how
forward looking the behavior is. In other words, having rejected one extreme of complete myopia
( =0 ), we would like to get a sense of where individuals lie on the spectrum between complete
myopia ( =0 ) and “full” forward looking behavior ( ≈ 1). Relatedly, we are also interested in
the implications (relative to either of these extremes) of the amount of forward looking behavior
we detect for the the impact of alternative health insurance contracts on annual medical spending.
4.1 Quantifying the eﬀect of the future price on initial medical utilization
We start by quantifying the elasticity of initial medical utilization with respect to the future price.
The results reported in the previous section tested whether there was a relationship between the
future price and initial medical utilization. However, a concern with interpreting this relationship
as the causal eﬀect of the future price on initial medical utilization is that there is a mechanical
relationship between initial medical utilization (the dependent variable) and our measure of the
future price (the right-hand-side variable). The future price is a function of the plan (by coverage
tier) chosen, the month joined, and the monthly medical spending of people who join that plan (by
coverage tier) in that month; thus, the future price is a function of medical spending which is also
used in constructing the dependent variable. This is not a concern for testing the null of complete
myopia (i.e., testing whether the coeﬃcient on the future price is zero) which was the focus of the
last section, because under the null of complete myopia medical spending is not a function of the
future price. However, under the alternative hypothesis that individuals are forward looking, this
can bias away from zero the estimated response to the future price.
T oa d d r e s st h i sc o n c e r n ,w ep r e s e n tr e s u l t sf r o me stimating an instrumental variable version of
equation (8) in which we instrument for the future price with a simulated future price. Like the
20future price, the simulated future price is computed based on the characteristics of the plan (by
coverage tier) chosen and the month joined. However, unlike the future price which is calculated
based on the spending of people who joined that plan (by coverage tier) that month, the simulated
future price is calculated based on the spending of all employees in that ﬁrm and coverage tier in
our sample who joined either the deductible or no-deductible plan, regardless of join month.19 By
using a common sample of employee spending that does not vary with plan or join month, the
instrument is “purged” of any potential variation in initial medical utilization that is correlated
with plan and join month, in very much the same spirit as Currie and Gruber’s (1996) simulated
Medicaid eligibility instrument. An additional attraction of this IV strategy is that it helps correct
for any measurement error in our calculated future price (which would bias the coeﬃcient toward
zero). On net, therefore, the OLS may be biased upward or downward relative to the IV.
The bottom row of Table 5 shows the results from this IV strategy. As would be expected,
the ﬁrst stage is very strong and the IV estimates are statistically signiﬁcant.20 For the dependent
variable log initial spending, the point estimate from the IV results suggests that a 10 cent increase
in the expected end-of-year price is associated with a 7.8% decline in initial medical spending.
Given an average expected end-of-year price for people in our sample who choose the deductible
plan of about 70 cents, this suggests an elasticity of initial medical utilization with respect to the
future price of −056. For the dependent variable log time to ﬁrst claim, the IV results suggest
that a 10 cent increase in the expected end-of-year price is associated with a 5.6% increase in the
time to ﬁrst claim, or an elasticity of initial medical utilization with respect to the future price of
about −039.21
19Speciﬁcally, for every employee in our sample in a given ﬁrm and coverage tier (regardless of plan and join month)
we compute their monthly spending for all months that we observe them during the year that they join the plan,
creating a common monthly spending pool. We then simulate the future price faced by an employee in a particular
plan and join month by drawing (with replacement) 110,000 draws of monthly spending from this common pool, for
every month we need a monthly spending measure. For the ﬁrst month we draw from the pool of ﬁrst month spending
(since people may join the plan in the middle of the month, the ﬁrst month’s spending has a diﬀerent distribution
from other months) whereas for all other months in the plan that year we draw from the pool (across families and
months) of non ﬁrst month spending. For each simulation we then compute the expected end-of-year price based on
the draws.
20The ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient from the regression of the future price on the instrument (as well as plan-by-coverage
tier ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm-by-start month ﬁxed eﬀects) yields a coeﬃcient (on the instrument) of 0.56 (standard error
0.024).
21In principle, the IV estimate of the impact of the future price on the ﬁrst three months’ spending could be biased
upward since, over the ﬁrst three months, 17% of the individuals in deductible plans spend past the deductible. If
individuals are at least partially forward looking, the probability of hitting the deductible in the ﬁrst three months
c o u l db ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hj o i nm o n t h ,w h i c hw o u l di n t r o d u c ev a r i a t i o nd u r i n gt h eﬁr s tt h r e em o n t hi nt h es p o tp r i c e
among individuals who join the same plan in diﬀerent months. Once again, this is not a problem for testing the null
of complete myopia; nor is it a problem when the dependent variable is the time to ﬁrst claim (since the spot price
is the same for all individuals within a plan at the time of ﬁrst claim). In practice, moreover, any upward bias is
likely unimportant quantitatively. We estimate a virtually identical response to the future price when the dependent
variable is based on two-month (instead of three-month) spending, even though the fraction hitting the deductible
within the initial utilization period (and therefore the likely magnitude of the bias) drops by almost a half. Moreover,
there is no noticeable trend in the likelihood of hitting the deductible within the ﬁrst three months by the join month;
214.2 Mapping the estimated elasticity to economic primitives of interest
There are (at least) two related reasons why this estimate of the elasticity of initial medical utiliza-
tion with respect to the future price is an unsatisfactory answer to the question: how important
is forward looking behavior? The ﬁrst reason is that this elasticity measures the eﬀect of future
price on initial spending, while we suspect that total (annual) spending is the outcome variable
of interest for most research or policy questions associated with health insurance utilization. The
importance of dynamic incentives for annual spending may well be much lower than for initial
spending since the wedge between the spot price and the future price becomes smaller as health
shocks accumulate within the year and/or the end of the coverage period nears.
The second reason is that it is diﬃcult to assess whether the elasticity is large or small without
appropriate benchmarks. We would like to compare our estimated elasticity with respect to the
future price to the “primitive” price elasticity, i.e. the underlying elasticity that is driven by
substitution between health and income and is purged of dynamic incentives. However, the same
motivation that prompted us to write this paper also implies that the prior empirical literature does
not provide such benchmarks. As noted in the introduction, most papers in this literature estimate
the elasticity of demand for medical care with respect to its price under a speciﬁc assumption
about how forward looking individuals are. For example, the commonly cited price elasticity of
demand for medical care of −02 from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment was estimated
under the assumption that individual behavior is completely myopic (Keeler and Rolph, 1988),
which is precisely the question we are investigating.22
Some assumption about the nature and extent of forward looking behavior is required in the
existing literature because it has not examined the impact of linear contracts on spending. If we had
an estimate of the utilization response to the coinsurance rate in a linear contract, for which the price
of medical care is constant for an individual throughout the year, this would be a useful benchmark
against which to compare our estimated response to the future price. In a linear contract, dynamic
considerations should not aﬀect utilization decisions, so that the behavioral response to diﬀerent
prices (coinsurance rates) would be invariant to the extent of forward looking behavior, and could
therefore shed light on the "primitive" substitution between health and income. However, we know
of no estimates of the response to a linear contract, nor a source of clean variation in the (constant)
coinsurance rate that could be used to identify this response.23 In the remainder of this section,
hitting the deductible within a short time after enrollment therefore appears to be primarily determined by large and
possibly non-discretionary health shocks, rather than an endogenous spending response to the future price.
22More precisely, Keeler and Rolph (1988) assume that individuals are completely myopic about the possibility of
future health shocks in making current medical spending, but that they have perfect foresight regarding all of the
year’s medical spending associated with a given health shock.
23In the Appendix we show how we can use the experimental variation from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment
in both the coinsurance rate and the out-of-pocket maximum to extrapolate (out of sample) to the eﬀect of the
c o i n s u r a n c er a t ei nap l a nw i t ha ni n ﬁnite out-of-pocket maximum, which thus approximates the response to a linear
contract. Our point estimates, while quite imprecise in most speciﬁcations, tend to suggest a semi-elasticity of
medical utilization with respect to the price of a linear contract that ranges from our estimate of the semi-elasticity
with respect to the future price to up to twice as large as this estimate. We interpret the results of this exercise as
22we therefore calibrate a stylized dynamic model in order to translate our baseline estimate of the
response to the future price into economic primitives of interest.
Calibration exercise To try to gauge what our estimated elasticity with respect to the future
price implies for how forward looking individuals are, as well as to assess the implications of this
ﬁnding for the impact of alternative health insurance contracts on annual medical spending, we
turn to the stylized model of medical utilization decisions in response to health shocks that we
d e v e l o p e di nS e c t i o n2 . W ei n v e s t i g a t ew h a td e g r e eo ff o r w a r dl o o k i n gb e h a v i o r( )i sn e e d e di n
that model to generate the magnitude of the response of initial medical utilization to the future
price that we estimated in our data. Speciﬁcally, we calibrate the other parameters of the model
and then simulate the response of initial medical utilization to the future price under alternative
assumptions about ; we search for the value of  that, in this calibrated model, produces the
response to the future price that we estimated in the foregoing empirical work.
To do this exercise requires that we calibrate the other primitives of the model in Section 2.
T h e s ea r et h ea r r i v a lr a t e of medical shocks, and the distribution of medical shocks () when
they arrive. The latter can be rewritten as () ≡ 2(|)1().T h a t i s , 1() represents
the unconditional distribution of the total spending that would be required to treat medical shocks
and 2(|) represents the distribution of the (monetized) utility loss from not treating a medical
shock of size ; in that sense, the distribution of  relative to  (or simply the distribution of the
ratio ) can be thought of as the “primitive” price elasticity that captures substitution between
health and income. As  is higher (lower), the utility loss is greater (smaller) relative to the cost
of treating the shock, so (conditional on the price) the medical shock is more (less) likely to be
treated.
We draw on data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment to calibrate these additional
parameters.24 Conducted over three to ﬁve years in the 1970s on a representative population of
individuals under 65, the key feature of the RAND experiment was to experimentally vary the
health insurance plans to which individuals were assigned. In particular, the coinsurance in the
plans varied from “free care” (zero coinsurance rate) to 100% coinsurance rate, with individuals
also assigned to 25%, 50%, and 95% coinsurance rates. The details of the experimental design as
well as the main results in terms of the impact of consumer cost sharing on healthcare spending
and health have been summarized elsewhere (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse et al., 1993).25 The
estimates from this famous study still remain the standard reference for calibration exercises that
require a moral hazard estimate for health insurance (e.g., Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo,
2008; Mahoney, 2010; Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011) and the standard benchmark with which to
compare newer estimates of the impact of health insurance on health spending (e.g., Finkelstein,
2007; Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight, 2010; Finkelstein et al., 2011).
suggestive of potentially substantial, but perhaps not full, forward looking behavior.
24The data from the RAND experiment have, very helpfully, been made publicly available by the RAND investi-
gators through ICPSR.
25In the Appendix we provide some more details on the experimental design and the data.
23Two features of the RAND experiment are very useful for our particular calibration exercise.
First, the existence of detailed data on medical claims under a zero cost sharing (free care) plan
is not something that, to our knowledge, exists elsewhere. Such data allow us to calibrate the
distribution of medical shocks ( and 1()) from data that is “uncensored” by any response to cost-
sharing; by contrast, any other plan with positive consumer cost sharing only provides information
on the medical shocks that are endogenously treated. Second, the experimental variation in plan
assignment helps us calibrate the primitive price elasticity 2(|).
We defer many of the calibration details to the Appendix, and only summarize them here brieﬂy.
In the ﬁrst step of our calibration exercise, we perform a simple statistical exercise to calibrate the
weekly arrival and distribution of medical shocks ( and 1()) based on the detailed utilization
data for the approximately 2,400 family-years we observe in the RAND’s free care plan.
In the second step, we use the experimental plan variation in the RAND data to calibrate
2(|). As mentioned above and discussed in more detail in the Appendix, the RAND exper-
iment does not involve variation in linear contracts that would allow us to directly estimate the
“primitive” price elasticity 2(|). Rather, families in the experiment were randomized into plans
with diﬀerent coinsurance rates and then, within each positive coinsurance rate, they were further
randomized into plans with diﬀerent out-of-pocket maximums. The observed changes in behavior,
as both the coinsurance rate and the out-of-pocket maximum are experimentally varied, are there-
fore inﬂuenced by both 2(|) and . Our second step of the calibration exercise uses the random
assignment of families to plans and our calibrated model of the arrival and distribution of medical
shocks, to map the spending response to diﬀerent plans to values of 2(|) and  that would
rationalize this spending response. Fortunately, the resultant values of 2(|) are quite stable,
and are not at all sensitive to the value of , so that we can use the RAND experiment to calibrate
2(|) without knowledge of .26 We can thus use the experimental variation to calibrate 2(|),
and are left with  as the only remaining unknown primitive.
In the ﬁnal step of the calibration exercise, we use the calibrated parameters of the model
that we have just described to simulate initial medical utilization under deductible contracts with
coverage horizons of 3 to 11 months, artiﬁcially replicating the setting in which we obtained our
estimated elasticity of initial medical utilization with respect to the future price. We repeat this
simulation under alternative assumptions about the value of . Higher values of  correspond to
greater changes in initial medical utilization as the coverage horizon varies. To quantify this, we
26Less fortunately, the converse is not true: the RAND experiment by itself does not allow us to pin down  with any
conﬁdence. In principle, the experimental variation in both coinsurance rates and out of pocket maximums makes
the RAND data seem perfectly suited to test and quantify forward looking behavior (since there is experimental
variation in the future price conditional on the experimentally determined spot price). In practice, however, using the
RAND data to estimate the behavioral response to the future price encounters two important obstacles. The ﬁrst is
conceptual: the combination of non-trivial risks of fairly large expenditure shocks and a preponderance of relatively low
out-of-pocket maximums means that is diﬃcult to isolate variation in the future price, as it mechanically generates
variation in spot prices that is driven by large medical shocks that are greater than the (lower) out of pocket
maximums. The second obstacle is practical: given its much smaller sample size, our attempt to use the RAND
variation (despite the ﬁrst issue) to estimate the behavioral response to the future price produced extremely noisy
estimates. The Appendix provides additional details and results of this analysis.
24regress, for each , initial medical utilization in the simulated data on the future price. We then
ask what value of  gives rise to the magnitude of the change in initial medical utilization with
respect to the future price that we estimated based on variation in the coverage horizon in our
employer-provided data (see last two rows of Table 5).
Calibrated value of  Figure 2 illustrates our exercise by plotting the semi-elasticity of initial
(three month) medical spending with respect to the future price implied by each value of .O u r
point estimate of the relationship between initial medical spending and future price was −108 in
the OLS estimation in the penultimate row of Table 5, with the 95% conﬁdence interval ranging
from −166 to −050. Figure 2 indicates that this point estimate in the simulated data is achieved
with  =0 2, with the 95% conﬁdence interval ranging from 006 to 045.T a b l e 7 s u m m a r i z e s
the implied ’s from the simulation exercises using the alternative dependent variable (time to ﬁrst
claim) and based on IV estimation rather than OLS estimation in both the actual and simulated
data.27 Across the four speciﬁcations, the point estimate of  are centered around 02, with a low
of around 01 and a high of around 07.
These calibration results therefore suggest that while we ﬁnd evidence of forward looking be-
havior, the extent of forward looking behavior is far from what would be implied by a perfectly
rational, fully forward looking individual ( ≈ 1) and closer to what would be implied by a fully
myopic individual ( =0 ). Of course, as we noted at the outset,  —o r“ f o r w a r dl o o k i n g ”b e h a v i o r
in our context — should not be interpreted as a pure rate of time preference; liquidity constraints
and/or imperfect understanding of the coverage details can push the estimated  below the rate of
time preference, and presumably do so in our context.
Implications for impact of health insurance on spending behavior We can also use our
calibrated model to try to assess whether the positive but low  we have calibrated is quantitatively
important for understanding the response of medical utilization to non-linear health insurance
contracts. In other words, we try to get a feel for whether, despite the fact that our testing exercise
in the main part of the paper rejects fully myopic behavior, myopia could be a reasonable way to
approximate behavior. The answer will depend of course not only on our estimate of  but also on
the other parameters of the model and the contracts examined. For example, if the deductible level
is low and the vast majority of individuals will exhaust it quickly, most individuals will spend most
of the time past the deductible, where they are eﬀectively covered by a linear contract, so that the
extent of forward looking behavior would not matter much for the impact of the health insurance
contract on medical utilization.
Figure 3 uses the calibrated model to report total annual spending for contracts with diﬀerent
deductible levels in the range of what is common in employer-provided health insurance contracts,
and full coverage (zero coinsurance rate) beyond the deductible. It shows results under alternative
27Since the endogeneity of the measured future price to initial medical utilization exists in both the actual and
simulated data, comparing the OLS estimates from the actual data to the OLS estimates of the simulated data — or
comparing the IV estimates from the actual data to the IV estimates from the simulated data — are both meaningful.
25assumptions about . The annual spending levels are based on simulated results from the cali-
brated model. We are interested in whether low values of  (of, say, 01 or 02) can be reasonably
approximated by an assumption of either complete myopia ( =0 ) — as underlies for example the
famous RAND estimate of the price elasticity of demand for medical care — or an assumption of
perfectly forward looking behavior ( ≈ 1) — as has been assumed by other papers estimating the
responsiveness of medical care to health insurance contracts. The results in the ﬁgure suggest that
both these extremes produce substantively diﬀerent results for the impact of these health insurance
contracts on total spending relative to our calibrated estimates of . For example, across all the
deductible levels we consider, as we move from the no-deducible plan to a positive deductible plan
the decrease in spending implied by  =0 2 is 25 to 50 percent smaller than what would be implied
by myopic behavior ( =0 ), and 50 to 270 percent greater than what would be implied by  =1 .
These results point to the empirical importance of accounting for dynamic incentives in analyses
of the impact of health insurance on medical utilization, and relatedly to the dangers in trying to
summarize health insurance contracts with a single price.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Our paper rejects the null of completely myopic behavior in individuals’ response to the non-linear
price of medical care. This result jointly indicates that individuals understand something about
the non-linear pricing schedule they face, and that they take account of the future price of care in
making current medical decisions. Calibration results from our stylized, dynamic model of medical
utilization suggests that, at least in the populations we study, individuals may be far from fully
forward looking, but that, nonetheless, the extent of forward looking behavior we detect has a non-
trivial impact for forecasting how medical spending will respond to changes in non-linear health
insurance contracts.
These ﬁndings have important implications for estimating or forecasting the impact of alterna-
tive health insurance contracts on medical spending, which is a topic that receives great interest and
attention both by academics and in the public policy arena. As we noted at the outset, the work
to date has almost exclusively focused on estimating (and then using) the elasticity of demand for
medical care with respect to its price. However, faced with a non-linear budget set, unless individ-
uals are completely myopic or completely forward looking in their decision making, characterizing
m o r a lh a z a r di nh e a l t hi n s u r a n c eu s ing a single elasticity estimate is neither informative as to how
it should be used (relative to which price?) nor is it conceptually well-deﬁned (there are at least
two price elasticities that are relevant). Thus, our results highlight the need for more complete
modeling of medical utilization induced by the health insurance contract in estimating and fore-
casting the likely eﬀects of these non-linear pricing schedules among forward looking individuals.
More generally, our results speak to the question of whether individuals understand and respond
to the incentives embodied in non-linear pricing schedules, of which health insurance contracts are
just one of many common examples.
Of course, our ﬁndings are speciﬁc to our population, which consists of individuals with employer-
26provided health insurance. Such individuals may be more forward looking than the general pop-
ulation, or may be less liquidity constrained and therefore less responsive to the spot price. It is
therefore very possible that in other populations, particularly populations with lower education or
income, the extent or even the existence of forward looking behavior might be very diﬀerent. In
settings where individuals appear to behave mostly or entirely myopically it becomes both interest-
ing and important to understand the sources of this apparent myopia, such as the relative roles of
time horizon and liquidity constraints. We think that extending our analysis to other settings and
attempting to decompose the sources of any myopic component of behavior are promising directions
for future work.
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29Figure 1: Model illustration
Figure illustrates the implications from a numerical solution to a simple version of the model described
in Section 2. We assume  =0 2 and medical events are drawn uniformly from a two-point support of
( =5 0 = 50) and ( =5 0 = 45) Expected end-of-year price is equal to one minus the probability
of hitting the deductible by the end of the year.
30Figure 2: Calibration of 
Figure illustrates our calibration exercise. The plot presents the relationship implied by our calibration
exercise (see the Appendix for details) between  and the semi-elasticity of initial medical spending with
respect to the future price. The arrows then illustrate how the point estimate and the conﬁdence interval
of our semi-elasticity OLS estimate of the impact of the future price on initial spending (penultimate row of
Table 5) translate to a point estimate and a conﬁdence interval for .
31Figure 3: The eﬀect of  on annual spending
Figure illustrates the implications  on overall (annual) spending, given the calibration exercise (see the
Appendix for details), for a range of possible contracts. The black line represents a case of full insurance, in
which overall spending is highest and does not depend on . The other lines represent overall spending for
deductible contracts which provide full insurance (zero coinsurance rate) once the deductible level has been
reached.
32Table 1: Summary statistics
Single Family
A0 2004‐07 3,269 0 0 0.622 0.379 38.56 6.28
A1 2004‐07 3,542 250 500 0.408 0.254 35.68 6.42
B0 2001‐05 37,759 0 0 0.530 0.362 36.77 6.35
B1 2001‐05 9,553 150 300 0.382 0.341 36.87 6.29
C0 1999‐2002, 2004‐05 27,968 0 0 0.348 0.623 36.40 7.35
C1 1999‐2000 6,243 200 500 0.348 0.622 37.53 7.50
C2 2001‐02 8,055 250 625 0.323 0.606 38.66 7.56















 The sample includes employees who enroll in February through October.
 In computing the “average” enrollee month we number the join months from 2 (February) through 10
(October).
 We omit 2003 from the analysis since the plan documentation regarding the deductible plan was incomplete
in that year.
33Table 2: Variation in expected end-of-year price
[N = enrollees] Feb‐Apr May‐Jul Aug‐Oct
0 0.000 0.000 0.000
[N = 3,269] (N = 1,007) (N = 981) (N = 1,281)
250/500 0.512 0.603 0.775
[N = 3,542] (N = 975) (N = 1,114) (N = 1,453)
0 0.000 0.000 0.000
[N = 37,759] (N = 8,863) (N = 15,102) (N = 13,794)
150/300 0.529 0.630 0.806
[N = 9,553] (N = 2,165) (N = 4,175) (N = 3,213)
0 0.000 0.000 0.000
[N = 27,968] (N = 6,504) (N = 6,158) (N = 15,306)
200‐300/500‐750 0.543 0.633 0.811

















 Expected end-of-year price is equal to the fraction of individuals who do not hit the deductible by the end
of the calendar year (and therefore face a marginal price of 1). It is computed based on the plan’s deductible
level(s), the join month, and the annual spending of all the employees who joined that plan in that month;
we compute it separately for family and single coverage within a plan and report the enrollment-weighted
average.
 In ﬁrm C, we pool the three diﬀerent deductible plans (C1, C2, and C3) that are oﬀered in diﬀerent years.
34Table 3: Initial medical utilization by join quarter
 [N = enrollees] Feb‐Apr May‐Jul Aug‐Oct Feb‐Apr May‐Jul Aug‐Oct
0 1,092 1,409 1,270 42.8 43.2 43.7
[N = 3,269] (s.d. = 2,679) (s.d. = 9,217) (s.d. = 4,733) (s.d. = 33.2) (s.d. = 33.4) (s.d. = 33.06)
250/500 727 788 451 63.9 63.4 66.7
[N = 3,542] (s.d. = 3,730) (s.d. = 4,324) (s.d. = 2,216) (s.d. = 33.4) (s.d. = 33.6) (s.d. = 32.7)
0 628 596 647 57.0 58.3 58.8
[N = 37,759] (s.d. = 4,841) (s.d. = 3,632) (s.d. = 2,886) (s.d. = 33.3) (s.d. = 33.7) (s.d. = 33.1)
150/300 723 682 521 65.0 65.5 71.1
[N = 9,553] (s.d. = 4,587) (s.d. = 4,046) (s.d. = 2,896) (s.d. = 32.3) (s.d. = 31.8) (s.d. = 29.7)
0 539 546 505 57.1 58.1 57.0
[N = 27,968] (s.d. = 3,087) (s.d. = 2,305) (s.d. = 3,017) (s.d. = 34.6) (s.d. = 34.0) (s.d. = 34.5)
200‐300/500‐750 515 581 495 56.1 56.2 57.6
















All utilization measures refer to utilization by the employee and any covered dependents.
 Days to ﬁrst claim is censored for all employees at 92 days. 42% of the observations are censored.
35Table 4: The relationship between join month and initial medical utilization
Difference DD Difference DD
 [N = enrollees] (1) (2) (3) (4)
0 ‐0.003 0.007
[N = 3,269] (0.023) (0.010)
250/500 ‐0.015 ‐0.012 0.003 ‐0.005
[N = 3,542] (0.021) (0.027) (0.014) (0.015)
0 ‐0.015 0.024
[N = 37,759] (0.007) (0.008)
150/300 ‐0.091 ‐0.075 0.059 0.033
[N = 9,553] (0.026) (0.025) (0.014) (0.010)
0 ‐0.004 0.003
[N = 27,968] (0.013) (0.006)
200‐300/500‐750 ‐0.027 ‐0.022 0.019 0.016


















Table reports coeﬃcients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regressing a measure of initial medical
care utilization (deﬁn e di nt h et o pr o w )o nj o i nm o n t h( w h i c hr a n g e sf r o m2( F e b r u a r y )t o1 0( O c t o b e r ) ) .
Columns (1) and (3) report the coeﬃc i e n to nj o i nm o n t hs e p a r a t e l yf o re a c hp l a n ,b a s e do ne s t i m a t i n g
equation (4); the regressions also include an indicator variable for coverage tier (single vs. family). Columns
( 2 )a n d( 4 )r e p o r tt h ed i ﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃc i e n to nt h ei n t e r a c t i o no fj o i nm o n t ha n dh a v i n ga
deductible plan, separately for each ﬁrm, based on estimating equation (5); the regressions also include plan
by coverage tier ﬁxed eﬀects and join month ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered on join month by
coverage tier.
 Dependent variable is ( +1 )where  is the total medical spending of the employee and any covered
family members in their ﬁrst three months in the plan.
 Dependent variable is () where “time” is the number of days to ﬁrst claim by any covered family
member, censored at 92. We estimate the regressions in columns (3) and (4) by Tobit.
36Table 5: The relationship between expected end-of-year price and initial medical utilization
Difference DD Difference DD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
‐0.92 ‐0.76 0.294 0.046
(0.30) (0.51) (0.176) (0.191)
‐2.02 ‐1.73 1.171 0.677
(0.57) (0.54) (0.363) (0.227)
‐0.89 ‐0.81 0.357 0.254













Firm B4 7 , 3 1 2
Firm C4 7 , 8 9 9
Table reports coeﬃcients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regressing a measure of initial medical
care utilization (deﬁned in the top row) on the expected end-of-year price, computed for each plan (by
coverage tier) and join month. Columns (1) and (3) report the coeﬃcient on expected end-of-year price
() separately for each deductible plan in each ﬁrm, based on estimating equation (6); the regressions also
include an indicator variable for coverage tier (single vs. family). Columns (2) and (4) report the coeﬃcient
on expected end-of-year price () from estimating equation (7), which now includes the no-deductible plans
as well; these regressions also include plan by coverage tier ﬁxed eﬀects and join month ﬁxed eﬀects. In
t h eb o t t o mt w or o w s ,w er e p o r tt h ec o e ﬃcient on expected end-of-year price () from estimating equation
(8) using OLS and IV (respectively) by pooling the data from all ﬁrms and plans; in addition to plan by
coverage tier and join month ﬁxed eﬀects, these regressions now also include ﬁrm by join month ﬁxed eﬀects.
Standard errors are clustered on join month by coverage tier by ﬁrm. The IV speciﬁcation makes use of a
simulated end-of-year price as an instrument for the expected end-of-year price (see text for details). The
coeﬃcient on the instrument in the ﬁrst stage is 0.56 (standard error 0.024); the F-statistic on the instrument
is 524.
 Dependent variable is ( +1 )where  is the total medical spending of the employee and any covered
family members in their ﬁrst three months in the plan
 Dependent variable is () where “time” is the number of days to ﬁrst claim by any covered family
member, censored at 92 days. We estimate the regressions in columns (3) and (4) by Tobit.
37Table 6: Robustness and speciﬁcation checks
Coeff on fp Std. Err. Coeff on fp Std. Err.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Baseline (logs) 102,022 ‐1.08 (0.29) 0.357 (0.113)
(2) Level 102,022 ‐394.43 (162.12) 14.842 (4.429)
(3) QMLE Poisson 102,022 ‐0.70 (0.25) ‐‐ ‐‐
(4) OLS (No Tobit) 102,022 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.114 (0.057)
(5) Varying censor points 102,022 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.330 (0.114)
(6) Cox proportional hazard model 102,022 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐0.347 (0.109)
(7) Control for Demographics 102,014 ‐0.98 (0.26) 0.524 (0.121)
(8) Only those who remain for 2nd year 64,398 ‐0.73 (0.34) 0.161 (0.133)
(9) Dep. Var. measured in 2nd year 64,398 ‐0.17 (0.31) ‐‐ ‐‐
(10) Dep. Var. measured Jan‐Mar of 2nd year 64,398 ‐0.44 (0.26) 0.172 (0.106)
 Initial Spending Time to First Claim
Specification N
Table reports results from alternative analyses of the relationship between initial medical utilization and
expected end-of-year price. Row (1) shows the baseline results from estimating equation (8) by OLS in
columns 1 and 2 and by Tobit in columns 3 and 4, as in the penultimate row of Table 5. Alternative
rows report single deviations from this baseline as explained below. In row (2) the dependent variables are
deﬁned in levels rather than logs. Mean dependent variables are 596.2 dollars (initial spending) and 58.3
days ((censored) time to ﬁrst claim). In row (3) the dependent variable is deﬁn e di nl e v e l s( n o tl o g s )a n d
the regression is estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson instead of OLS. In row (4) the regression
is estimated by OLS rather than Tobit. In row (5) we estimate the same regression as in the baseline, but
we now allow the censoring point to vary with join month, from 92 days if the employee joined in October
to 334 days if the employee joined in February. In row (6) we estimate a Cox semi-parametric proportional
hazard model on the time to ﬁrst claim (censored at 92 days); note that here a longer time to ﬁrst claim is
indicated by a negative coeﬃcient (a lower “failure” rate). In row (7) we add controls for age, gender, and
start year (as well as interactions of each of those with the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects) to the baseline speciﬁcation.
In row (8) we estimate the baseline speciﬁcation on a smaller sample of employees who remain in the ﬁrm
for the entire subsequent year; in row (9) we estimate the baseline speciﬁcation on this same sample, but
deﬁning the dependent variable based on utilization in the same three months of the subsequent year (i.e.,
their ﬁrst full year in the ﬁrm); in row (10) we estimate the baseline speciﬁcation on this same sample but
now deﬁne the dependent variable based on utilization in January to March of the ﬁrst full year in the ﬁrm.
38Table 7: Calibrating 
  OLS IV Tobit Tobit IV
a
A. Estimated semi‐elasticity
   Point estimate ‐1.08 ‐0.78 0.36 0.56
   CI Lower Bound ‐0.50 ‐0.24 0.14 0.30
   CI Upper Bound ‐1.67 ‐1.33 0.58 0.83
Implied delta
   Point estimate 0.20 0.12 0.26 0.67
   CI Lower Bound 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.19
   CI Upper Bound 0.45 0.28 0.76 1.00
Log (Three month Spending) Log(Time to First Claim)
Panel A reports the estimated semi-elasticities of initial medical utilization with respect to the future price;
these are taken directly from the last two rows of Table 5. Panel B shows the implied values of  associated
with each estimate based on the calibration exercise described in the text.
 We impose 1 for the upper bound of the conﬁdence interval for the implied  in the Tobit IV case based on
our a priori knowledge that  cannot be higher than 1; no  less than 1 produces a semi-elasticity as large




This appendix describes in more detail the uses we make of data from the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment.28 Appendix A describes our attempt to use the RAND experiment random assign-
ment of out-of-pocket maximums as the basis for an additional test for forward looking behavior.
Appendix B discusses our attempt to use the RAND data to approximately the “primitive” price
elasticity of demand , to serve as a benchmark for our estimated response to the future price. Ap-
pendix C provides a detailed explanation of how we use the RAND data for the calibration exercises
described in Section 4.
As explained in the main text, the RAND experiment, conducted in 1974-1981, randomly as-
signed participating families to health insurance plans with diﬀerent levels of cost sharing. Each
plan was characterized by two parameters: the coinsurance rate (the share of initial expenditures
paid by the enrollee) and the out-of-pocket maximum, referred to as the “Maximum Dollar Ex-
penditure” (MDE). Families were assigned to plans with coinsurance rates ranging from 0% (“free
care”) to 100%. Within each coinsurance rate, families were randomly assigned to plans with MDEs
set equal to 5%, 10%, or 15% of family income, up to a maximum of $750 or $1,000.29
A. Testing forward-looking behavior using the RAND data
The latter feature of the RAND plan assignment process — random assignment of MDEs — would
seem to provide an ideal experimental setting for a test of forward looking behavior since it po-
tentially provides random variation in the future price among individuals assigned to the same
coinsurance (and hence the same spot price). While diﬀerences in MDEs across individual families
were due in part to diﬀerences in family income, diﬀerences in average MDE and average end-of-
year price across plans can be treated as randomly assigned. Appendix Table A6 provides sample
counts and various summary statistics for the RAND plans.30 As the table shows, average MDEs
were considerably higher in plans where the MDE was set equal to 10% or 15% of family income
than in plans where the MDE was set to 5% of income. These diﬀerences generated corresponding
diﬀerences in the share of families hitting the MDE and in expected end-of-year price (columns (5)
and (6)).
Columns (8) and (9) of Appendix Table A6 present results from a regression of time to ﬁrst
claim on expected end-of-year price in the RAND. Speciﬁcally, we run the regression
Log(Time-to-First-Claim) =  ·  +  ·  + 0
 +  (9)
where is the future price (or expected end-of-year price),  is the coinsurance rate,  indexes
families,  indexes plans, and  is a vector of dummy variables for site and start month in the
28The original RAND investigators have very helpfully made their data publicly available. We accessed the data
through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
29For a detailed description of the plans and other aspects of the experiment, see Newhouse et al. (1993).
30Appendix Table A6 omits the RAND’s “individual deductible plans,”which had coinsurance rates of 0% for inpa-
tient services and 100% or 95% for outpatient services, because there was no MDE variation within this coinsurance
rate structure.
41experiment by year.31 As shown, we run the regression separately for each coinsurance rate group
and then pool all groups (or all groups except the free care plan) to maximize power (we also run a
speciﬁcation with a full set of coinsurance rate dummies in place of the coinsurance rate term). We
run both OLS and Tobit regressions, where the latter account for censoring of time to ﬁrst claim
at 367 days.
There are two important limitations to this analysis, so that despite its apparent advantages, the
RAND variation is in fact inferior to the variation generated by employee hire dates (the primary
variation used in the paper). First, as a practical matter, the RAND setting gives us much less
power to detect diﬀerences in spending by expected end-of-year price. The samples are smaller
(with a total sample size of 5,653 family-year observations across all plans, relative to more than
100,000 in the combined employer-provided sample), and there is much less variation in end-of-year
price. As a result, our estimates based on the RAND data are quite imprecise. Even in our most
inclusive speciﬁcation (bottom row of Table A6), we can neither reject the null of no response to
the future price nor reject a coeﬃcient on the future price of 3, far larger than what we ﬁnd in the
employer-provided data.
Second, conceptually, the variation in the MDE in the RAND data is not as clean for testing for
forward looking behavior as the variation in the coverage horizon that we use in the paper. To see
this, note that diﬀerences in expected end-of-year price are correlated with diﬀerences in spot price
even under the null hypothesis of no forward-looking behavior. Even if people are fully myopic,
families in low MDE plans will meet their MDEs sooner and will spend more of the year facing a 0%
spot price. As a result, they will have higher spending even if they are not at all forward-looking.32
Because 12% of families in the lowest MDE, highest coinsurance rate plan hit the MDE within the
very ﬁrst month of the experiment, this is a concern even when looking just at initial (e.g., one
month) spending.
We attempted to solve this problem by using time to ﬁrst claim as the outcome variable.
Unfortunately, however, some of RAND’s MDE levels are quite low, so they can aﬀect even the
spot prices families face when making decisions about their very ﬁrst health expenditure. To see
this, consider two families in plans with a 100% coinsurance rate. The ﬁrst family has an MDE
of $150, the second an MDE of $300. Suppose that, before either family has any other health
expenditures, each experiences a health shock that would cost $300 to treat. The out-of-pocket
cost of treating this shock would be $150 for the low MDE family but $300 for the high MDE
family, meaning that the low MDE family faces a spot price of only 50% for the episode, compared
to 100% for the high MDE family. Hence, the low MDE family will be more likely to treat the
episode, even if both families are fully myopic.
31Plan assignment was random only conditional on which of the experiment’s six sites a family lived at and when
the family enrolled in the experiment. For details, see Newhouse et al. (1993, Appendix B).
32In contrast, this is not a problem when using the variation in end-of-year price generated by month of hire. If
people are fully myopic, then early hires will have the same levels of three-month spending as late hires, and so the
two groups will be equally likely to hit their deductibles within three months and will face the same average spot
price.
42Because about half of outpatient episodes (deﬁned as in Appendix B below) are larger than
the smallest MDEs in the RAND sample, this problem is potentially quite signiﬁcant. Indeed, in
simulations mimicking the RAND setting, we obtain a large and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on end-of-year price in a regression for time to ﬁrst claim, even when we assume complete myopia.
Thus, we conclude that, even apart from the precision problems, we cannot use the RAND setting
to generate variation in the future price conditional on the spot price to test for forward looking
behavior.33
B. Approximating the “primitive” price elasticity using RAND data
Before turning to the model-based calibration exercise in the next sub-section, we ﬁrst present a
loose way of trying to gauge the extent of forward looking behavior by using the experimental
variation in contracts in the RAND data to generate an estimate of the “primitive” price elasticity
of medical care utilization which we then compare to our previously estimated response to the
future price from the main empirical work in the paper.
The variation used in the main empirical work in the paper is not useful in this regard, as
we observe neither linear contracts nor identifying variation for plan assignment. The RAND
experiment does not provide this ideal variation either, since all of the RAND contracts (except
for the free care contract) involve a non-linear pricing schedule; families were randomized into
coinsurance rates and then, within each positive coinsurance rate, they were further randomized
into plans with an out-of-pocket maximum (known as the “maximum dollar amount” or MDE in
the RAND context) of either 5%, 10%, or 15% of income (up to a maximum of $1,000 or $750);
above the MDE the price of care is zero.34 However, RAND’s experimental variation (within
each coinsurance rate) in the out-of-pocket maximum allows us to estimate its eﬀe c t ,a n dt h e nt o
extrapolate out of sample to obtain the behavioral response to a contract where the out-of-pocket
maximum is suﬃciently high, thus approximating a linear contract.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate the regression
 = 1 ·  + 2 · _ + 3 ·  · _ +  (10)
where  is a measure of medical utilization by family  in plan ,  is the coinsurance rate of
the plan the family was randomized into (which is either 0%, 25%, 50%, or 95%), and _
is the fraction of families within the same coinsurance rate and MDE assignment that hit (i.e.,
33Two of the original RAND investigators, Keeler and Rolph (1988), also attempt to use the RAND data to test
for forward looking behavior, but they use a diﬀerent empirical strategy. They do not exploit the MDE variation,
and instead rely on within-year variation in how close families are to their MDEs. They test whether spending is
higher among families who are closer to hitting their MDEs, as would be expected - all else equal - if people are
forward looking. They make several modeling assumptions to try to address the (selection) problem that families
with higher underlying propensities to spend are more likely to come close to hitting their MDEs. They also assume
that individuals have perfect foresight regarding all the subsequent medical expenses within a year associated with a
given health shock. They conclude that they cannot reject the null of complete myopia with respect to future health
shocks.
34All dollar amounts are reported in current (1970s) dollars.
43spent past) the MDE during the year. For the positive coinsurance plans this number ranges from
8 percent to 40 percent depending on the plan assignment (see Appendix Table A6, column (5)).
The coeﬃcient of interest is 1, which we interpret as the responsiveness of medical utilization to
a change in the coinsurance rate of a linear contract; this involves extrapolating out of sample to
where _ =0  which would be the case for a suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hM D E .
Because the share of families in a given plan assignment that hit the MDE depends on family
spending behavior, which itself may be endogenous to plan assignment, we also present IV speciﬁ-
cations in which we instrument for the share of families in a given plan that hit the MDE with the
simulated share hitting the MDE. The “simulated share” is calculated as the share of the entire
(common) sample of individuals across all plans that would have hit the MDE if assigned to the
given plan, in a similar spirit to the IV exercise we reported in the previous section.
Appendix Table A7 presents the results. Our sample size is approximately 1,500 families (about
5,600 family-years).35 As in the previous analysis, we analyze both the responsiveness of the ﬁrst
three months of spending and the time to ﬁrst claim. Here, we also add total (annual) spending as
an additional outcome (as the proportional response to a linear contract should not, in principle,
be diﬀerent for initial and total spending).
The response to the linear coinsurance — while fairly imprecise in most speciﬁcations — can now
be compared to our estimates of the response to the future price from the previous sub-section.
Using the IV speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd a spending semi-elasticity with respect to the price of a linear
contract that ranges from −12 to −17, which is roughly twice as large as the semi-elasticity of
−078 with respect to the future price that we found in last section (see last row of Table 5).
Similarly, we estimate that the semi-elasticity of the time to ﬁrst claim with respect to the price
of a linear contract is 0.53, which is virtually identical to our analogous semi-elasticity estimate of
0.56 with respect to the future price. Thus, overall the results are indicative of substantial, but
perhaps not full, forward looking behavior.
C. Model calibration
In Section 4 of the main text, we explain how we use the RAND data to calibrate a model that
allows us to map the estimated elasticity of initial spending with respect to the end-of-year price
to the parameter . Here, we provide more details about this calibration exercise.
Calibrating the medical shock process ( and 1()) We calibrate the medical shock process
using data from the 620 families (approximately 2,400 family-years) participating in the RAND’s
“free care” plan. We calibrate the distribution of inpatient and outpatient shocks separately and
also allow for heterogeneity across families in the distribution of shocks. Speciﬁcally, letting  index
35Appendix Table A6 shows the exact plans we study and the distribution of families across those plans. The
entire RAND experiment involved about 2,400 families. We exclude from this analysis the approximately 400 families
randomized into the 95% coinsurance plan with a ﬁxed ($150 per person) MDE plan (also know as the “individual
deductible” plan) because for this MDE only the coinsurance rate diﬀered (it was 95% for outpatient care but free
for inpatient care), and the approximately 400 families randomized into an HMO.
44families and  index types of spending (inpatient or outpatient), we assume that in each period ,
family  draws a shock of type  with probability . In periods where a family does experience
shocks of type , the shocks are drawn i.i.d. from a lognormal distribution with mean  and
variance .
Our procedure for obtaining the various spending distribution parameters is as follows. We
deﬁne a period  as a week. We group together all claims of a given type separated by less than
one week and deﬁne each grouped set of claims as one episode, assigning it to the ﬁrst week of the
episode; this generated about 6,000 inpatient episodes and about 77,000 outpatient episodes over
the course of the entire experiment. For each family and each type of spending, we then compute:
 as the share of weeks (over the course of the entire experiment36)i nw h i c hf a m i l y experienced
an episode of type ,w es e t as the average size of family ’s episodes of type ,a n d as the
variance of family ’s episodes of type . Because  is extremely noisy (even more so than )
and because it is unavailable for families with only one shock of a given type, we set  to be the
average of  for all families.
Partly to reduce noise and partly to make simulating the model computationally feasible, we
next divide families into ﬁve-percentile groups based on their values of . We replace each value
of  and  with the mean of the respective variable for family ’s percentile group. This
approach eliminates cases where the probability of outpatient shock is zero, but leaves 55% of the
sample with a zero probability of inpatient medical shocks. This is consistent with our intuition
that every family faces some meaningful risk of experiencing an outpatient shock, but some families
(speciﬁcally, those who experience no inpatient episodes at any point during the experiment) may
face so little risk of an inpatient episode that they perceive it as approximately zero.
Appendix Figure A1 and Appendix Table A8 compare the actual distributions of expenditures
in the free care plan with the simulated distributions. Appendix Figure A1 presents a histogram of
total (the sum of inpatient and outpatient) spending, while Appendix Table A8 reports the means
and standard deviations of log inpatient, outpatient, and total spending, as well as the share of
families with no inpatient, outpatient, or total spending over the course of a year ( =5 2 ).37
The ﬁt is notably better for outpatient than inpatient spending, basically because, as others
have also found (see, e.g., French and Jones, 2004), the lognormal distribution is a better ﬁt
for outpatient than inpatient spending. Nonetheless, the ﬁt is fairly good for both categories of
spending, and seems (to us) to capture the main properties of health spending for the purpose of
our calibration exercise.
Calibrating the distribution of valuations (2()) Recall that  represents the (mone-
tized) health cost of a given shock, and so  represents the health cost of a given shock relative
to the cost of treatment. For example, if  =0 5 then the health cost of not treating a given
shock is equal to half the cost of the treatment.
36Families participated in the experiment for periods of either three or ﬁve years.
37Throughout, we deﬁne log spending as ( +1 )in order to avoid missing values.
45We calibrate the distribution of  for outpatient shocks, but assume  =1for all inpatient
shocks. That is, we assume that individuals treat all inpatient shocks, regardless of what share of
the cost of treatment they pay out of pocket. This analytic choice is done primarily to make the
calibration exercise much more feasible (inpatient shocks are suﬃciently rare relative to outpatient
shocks that it is much harder to use the data to calibrate  for them). It also reﬂects our intuition
that most health shocks for which treatment requires hospitalization are much less discretionary
than outpatient care; this is consistent with the basic ﬁndings from the RAND experiment itself
(Newhouse et al., 1993) as well as subsequent quasi-experimental evidence (e.g., Einav et al., 2011)
and our ﬁndings in this paper that only outpatient care appears to respond to the future price
(Appendix Table A2).
For outpatient shocks, we assume that  follows a Beta distribution with parameters  and
,s ot h a t ∼ ().T h u s ,0 and 0 are the key primitive price elasticity parameters of
the model. The ratio ( + ) gives the mean value of . We use data on the 95%, 50%, and
25% coinsurance RAND plans to calibrate  and .38 We simulate the model described in Section
2 to generate utilization data for each coinsurance rate. We then try to match three moments of
the actual RAND data for each coinsurance rate: the mean of log spending, the standard deviation
of log spending, and the share of the sample with zero spending.39 Speciﬁcally, we minimize the
sum of squared diﬀerences, weighting by the diﬀerent coinsurance rates’ RAND sample sizes.
So far, we have glossed over a tension with our calibration strategy. Namely, that the distribution
of spending (using the model of Section 2) depends not only on the distributions of , ,a n d,
but also on . And yet our goal is to obtain the parameters of the  distribution without
knowing  so that we can then determine what value of  yields the elasticities we obtained from
the employer-provided data.
Our strategy succeeds simply because it happens that the objective function is quite ﬂat in 
but quite steep (and generally invariant to )i n and . Panel A of Appendix Table A9 shows, for
11 values of  ranging from zero to one, the optimal values of  and  and the resulting values of the
objective function. As the table shows, the model selects very similar values of  and  regardless
of the assumed value of , and yields similar values of the objective function (at the optimal values
of  and ). Basically, whatever the choice of ,t h eb e s tﬁt involves [] ≈ 055 and a highly
bimodal distribution for , with modes near 0 and 1.40
Based on eyeballing the simulation results, we select  =0 3 and  =0 25 for our calibration
exercise; these are the values that minimize the objective function averaged over the possible values
of  we examine. Panel B of Appendix Table A9 shows that these values yield a fairly tight ﬁtt o
the RAND data for any assumed value of .
38We do not make use of the data from the “mixed coinsurance rate” plans included in Appendix Table A6.
Incorporating these plans would have required further complicating the model in order to introduce multiple types
of outpatient spending.
39As before, we deﬁne log spending as ( +1 )to avoid missing values.
40Intuitively, the bimodal distribution reﬂects the fact that the sample means from the RAND data are almost the
same for the 25% and 50% coinsurance rate plans, implying that, for most outpatient shocks, people either will not
treat the shock at a coinsurance rate of 25% or will treat it unless the coinsurance rate is quite high.
46Mapping the elasticity of initial spending with respect to end-of-year price to  Having
calibrated the key elements of the model, the ﬁnal step in our calibration exercise is to simulate the
data generating process from our employer-provided data and obtain estimates of the responsiveness
of initial spending to the expected end-of-year price in the simulated data.
We consider plans with deductible of $0, $250, $750, and $1,000, with no cost-sharing above the
deductible. For each of these plans, we use the calibrated parameters described above, and a range
of values for  (the only remaining free parameter), and simulate spending given time horizons of
47, 42, 37, 32, 27, 22, 17, or 12 weeks (analogous to hire dates ranging from February to October).
For each of 10,000 simulated families in each deductible-horizon combination, we obtain simulated
spending in the ﬁrst 12 periods (analogous to ﬁrst three month spending) and time to ﬁrst claim
(here measured in weeks and censored at 12); in addition, for each deductible/horizon combination,
we obtain average “end-of-year”price (here, just average price at the end of the horizon).
Letting  denote levels of the deductible,  index horizon lengths, and  index families, we use
the simulated data to estimate the regression
 =  ·  +  +  (11)
Here,  is the coeﬃcient of interest, while the ’s are dummy variables for deductible level. We
estimate the regression for log(“three month”) spending (spending in the ﬁrst 12 periods) and for
time to ﬁrst claim. For reasons explained in the main text, we run both OLS and IV regressions, in
the latter case instrumenting for  with the average end-of-period price after  periods among
families with the maximum time horizon (47 weeks).
We repeat the above exercise for 101 values of  ranging from 0 to 1. We can then obtain point
estimates and conﬁdence intervals for  by comparing the estimates of the responsiveness of initial
spending to end-of-year price obtained in the simulations with the estimates and the bounds of
the conﬁdence intervals obtained from the employer-provided data.41 The results are presented in
Figure 2 in the main text.
41Technically, the conﬁdence intervals on  should also take into account the standard errors on  from the regres-
sions in the simulated data. However, because we can make the simulations so large — we simulate 10,000 families
for each deductible horizon paid — the standard errors on  are eﬀectively zero.  simply describes the relationships
imposed by the model and the calibrated parameters.
47Appendix Figure A1: Fit of the calibration exercise of medical events
Figure shows the distribution of annual medical spending in the “free care” RAND data based on the actual
(black bars) and simulated (gray bars) data. The simulations use the calibrated parameters, as explained in
the Appendix. The actual data is based on the 2,376 family-years of data in the free care plan.
48Appendix Table A1: Additional plan details
Single Family Single Family Single Family Single Family
A0 2004‐07 3,269 0 0 0.10 0 2,500 5,000 250 500 0.3 0 5,000 10,000
A1 2004‐07 3,542 250 500 0.10 0 2,750 5,500 500 1,000 0.3 0 5,500 11,000
B0 2001‐05 37,759 0 0 0.00 15 0 0 250 500 0.2 0 1,250 2,500
B1 2001‐05 9,553 150 300 ?? ?? ?? 1,100 ?? ?? ?? 0 ?? ??
C0 1999‐05 27,968 0 0 0.00 15 0 0 300 750 0.3 0 3,000 6,000
C1 1999‐00 6,243 200 500 0.10 0 1,000 2,000 ?? ?? 0.3 0 3,750 7,500
C2 2001‐02 8,055 250 625 0.10 0 1,250 2,500 250 625 0.3 0 3,900 7,800


















“??” denotes an unknown feature of a plan.
 The sample includes employees who enroll in February through October.
 Coinsurance denotes the fraction of medical expenditures the insured must pay out of pocket after hitting
the deductible and prior to reaching the “stop loss.”
49Appendix Table A2: Responsiveness of diﬀerent types of care to the future price
(1) Log initial spending 3.32 ‐1.08 (0.29)
(2) Log initial outpatient spending 3.29 ‐1.06 (0.29)
(3) Initial spending 596.2 ‐394.4 (162.1)
(4) Initial outpatient Spending 445.0 ‐375.8 (107.7)
(5) Initial inpatient Spending 147.5 ‐19.8 (99.1)








Table reports results for diﬀerent types of medical spending of the analysis of the relationship between initial
medical spending and expected end-of-year price (“future price”). All rows show the results from estimating
equation (8) by OLS using diﬀerent dependent variables; in addition to “future price” the covariates in
this regression include plan by coverage tier ﬁxed eﬀects, join month ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm by join month
ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered on join month by coverage tier by ﬁrm. The ﬁrst row shows
the baseline results (see penultimate row in Table 5) for the dependent variable log initial spending (plus
1). In row 2 the dependent variable is the log of initial outpatient spending (plus 1). Rows 3 through 5
show results for the level of initial medical spending, the level of initial outpatient spending and the level
of initial inpatient spending respectively. The last row shows the results for an indicator variable for any
initial inpatient spending. “Initial” spending is deﬁn e da ss p e n d i n gi nt h eﬁrst three months of the plan for
all covered members of the plan.  = 102022.
50Appendix Table A3: Additional robustness exercises
Coeff on fp (S.E.) Coeff on fp (S.E.)
(1) Baseline 102,022 ‐1.08 (0.29) 0.357 (0.114)
Panel A: Altnerative sets of fixed effects
(2) Don't limit to within firm 102,022 ‐1.07 (0.30) 0.320 (0.121)
(3) Don't control for Tier 102,022 ‐3.98 (0.76) 1.943 (0.373)
(4) Tier x firm interactions 102,022 ‐1.04 (0.29) 0.355 (0.114)
Panel B:  Family vs Single Tier
(5) Family Tier 43,358 ‐0.90 (0.42) 0.132 (0.124)
(6) Single Tier 58,664 ‐1.15 (0.40) 0.579 (0.193)
Panel C: Using Additional Plan Characteristics to construct mp
(7) Baseline (Firms A and C) 54,710 ‐0.81 (0.32) 0.263 (0.127)
(8) Firms  A and C, refined fp measure 54,710 ‐0.90 (0.36) 0.293 (0.141)
Log Initial Spending Log Time to First Claim
N Specification
Table reports results from alternative analyses of the relationship between initial medical utilization and
expected end of year marginal price. The ﬁrst row shows the baseline results (see last row in Table 5) from
estimating equation (8) which pools the data across ﬁrms. In addition to the expected end of year marginal
price, the regressions also include plan by coverage tier ﬁxed eﬀects, join month ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm by
month ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered on join month by coverage tier by ﬁrm. Alternative rows
report single deviations from this baseline. In Row 2 we remove the ﬁrm by join month ﬁxed eﬀects from
the baseline. In Row 3 we remove the controls for coverage tier (so that there are plan ﬁxed eﬀects but not
plan by coverage tier ﬁxed eﬀects) from the baseline. In row 4 we add ﬁrm by coverage tier ﬁxed eﬀects and
ﬁrm by coverage tier by join month ﬁxed eﬀects to the baseline. In rows 5 and 6 we stratify the sample by
coverage tier. In Panel C we limit the analysis to the two ﬁrms (Alcoa and Firm C) in which we observe the
in-network coinsurance rate for all plans (see Appendix Table A1 for details). Row 7 reports the baseline
results limited to those two ﬁrms; Row 8 shows the sensitivity to using a reﬁned measure of future price
which accounts for the coinsurance rate (see Appendix Table A4 for details). As expected, not accounting
for the coinsurance rate in our baseline future price measure (row 7) biases downward our estimated impact
of the future price (compare rows 7 and 8).
51Appendix Table A4: Alternative construction of future price
Feb‐Apr May‐Jul Aug‐Oct Feb‐Apr May‐Jul Aug‐Oct
A0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0994 0.0995 0.0997
A1 0.512 0.603 0.775 0.560 0.643 0.798
C0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000











 Expected end-of-year price is equal to the fraction of individuals who do not hit the deductible by the end
of the calendar year (and therefore face a marginal price of 1). It is computed based on the plan’s deductible
level(s), join month, and the annual spending of all the employees in one’s plan and join month; we compute
it separately for family and single coverage within a plan and report the enrollment-weighted average.
 “Reﬁned” expected end-of-year price is equal to the coinsurance rate times the fraction of individuals who
hit the deductible but not the out-of-pocket maximum by the end of the year (and therefore face a marginal
price equal to the coinsurance rate) + the fraction of individuals who do not hit the deductible by the end
of the calendar year (and therefore face a marginal price of 1.) The reﬁned expected end-of-year price is
computed in the same manner as described above for the expected end-of-year price.
52Appendix Table A5: Diﬀerences in observables by plan and join month
Difference DD Difference DD
 [N = enrollees] (1) (2) (3) (4)
0 ‐0.009 ‐0.011
[N = 3,269] (0.004) (0.003)
250/500 ‐0.008 0.0020 ‐0.002 0.009
[N = 3,542] (0.002) (0.0041) (0.003) (0.004)
0 ‐0.004 ‐0.003
[N = 37,759] (0.003) (0.002)
150/300 ‐0.010 ‐0.0059 ‐0.004 ‐0.001
[N = 9,553] (0.004) (0.0026) (0.004) (0.003)
0 ‐0.014 0.009
[N = 27,968] (0.002) (0.002)
200‐300/500‐750 ‐0.019 ‐0.0045 0.009 0.000














Table reports coeﬃcients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regressing the dependent variable on
join month (which ranges from 2 (February) to 10 (October)). The dependent variables are demographic
characteristics (deﬁned in the top row) with overall means for “old” (i.e. age 45+) of 0.27 and for female of
0.48. Columns (1) and (3) report the coeﬃc i e n to nj o i nm o n t hs e p a r a t e l yf o re a c hp l a n ,b a s e do ne s t i m a t i n g
equation (4); the regressions also include an indicator variable for coverage tier (single vs. family). Columns
( 2 )a n d( 4 )r e p o r tt h ed i ﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃc i e n to nt h ei n t e r a c t i o no fj o i nm o n t ha n dh a v i n ga
deductible plan, separately for each ﬁrm, based on estimating equation (5); the regressions also include plan
by coverage tier ﬁxed eﬀects and join month ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered on join month by
coverage tier.
53Appendix Table A6: Summary statistics of the RAND data
OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Plan‐by‐plan analysis
5% of income up to $1,000 33 (33) $533 0.33 0.67 71
10% of income up to $1,000 29 (29) $801 0.21 0.79 83
15% of income up to $1,000 33 (33) $794 0.21 0.79 67
5% of income up to $1,000 418 (84) $559 0.40 0.57 89
10% of income up to $1,000 342 (80) $746 0.34 0.63 88
15% of income up to $1,000 470 (101) $817 0.33 0.63 101
5% of income up to $1,000 111 (26) $535 0.28 0.36 61
10% of income up to $1,000 76 (17) $779 0.16 0.42 85
15% of income up to $1,000 308 (84) $847 0.19 0.40 82
5% of income up to $750 189 (41) $499 0.28 0.22 79
10% of income up to $750 226 (44) $584 0.31 0.22 61
15% of income up to $750 159 (30) $689 0.16 0.26 64
5% of income up to $1,000 18 (18) $523 0.28 0.23 29
10% of income up to $1,000 19 (19) $600 0.16 0.26 44
15% of income up to $1,000 13 (13) $837 0.08 0.29 66
5% of income up to $750 192 (22) $518 0.17 0.21 75
10% of income up to $750 208 (31) $617 0.17 0.21 64
15% of income up to $750 207 (26) $683 0.18 0.21 63
5% of income up to $1,000 86 (52) $535 0.14 0.22 73
10% of income up to $1,000 70 (43) $818 0.11 0.22 41
15% of income up to $1,000 70 (44) $816 0.16 0.21 40














































































 Regression adjusted for diﬀerences in site, start month, and year across plans (see Newhouse et al. (1993,
Appendix B) for more details).
 Expected end-of-year price equals the share of families not hitting the MDE (in the given plan) times the
coinsurance rate. For the mixed coinsurance rates plans, we weight the two coinsurance rates based on their
shares of initial claims in the full sample; 25% of initial claims are for mental/dental.
 For families with no claims in a given year, time to ﬁrst claim is coded as 367.
 Columns (8) and (9) show the coeﬃcient on the expected end-of-year price () from estimating variants
of equation (9). In Panel A we regress log time-to- ﬁrst-claim on the expected end-of-year price (see column
(6)) and site and enrollment month by year dummies; plan assignment in the RAND experiment was random
conditional on the location (site) and when the family enrolled in the experiment (see Newhouse et al. (1993,
Appendix B) for more details). In Panel B we pool across plans and therefore add additional controls in the
form of either coinsurance dummies (ﬁrst row) or the coinsurance level directly (bottom two rows); the ﬁnal
row adds in the free care (0% coinsurance) plan. Standard errors are clustered on family.
54Appendix Table A7: Approximating the response to a linear contract in the RAND data
OLS IV OLS IV Tobit Tobit IV
‐1.21 ‐1.19 ‐1.78 ‐1.65 0.791 0.528
(0.73) (1.03) (0.73) (1.03) (0.503) (0.441)
0.45 0.43 0.20 0.21 ‐0.128 ‐0.147
(0.21) (0.25) (0.20) (0.24) (0.136) (0.111)
0.58 0.52 1.76 1.40 ‐0.522 ‐0.0729










Sample consists of 5,653 family-years (1,490 unique families) in the RAND data in one of the positive
coinsurance plans or the free care plan. “Share hit MDE” is the share of families in a given coinsurance and
maximum dollar expenditure (MDE) plan who spend past the MDE during the year. Because plan assignment
in the RAND experiment was random only conditional on site and month of enrollment in the experiment,
all regressions control for site and start month ﬁxed eﬀects (see Newhouse et al. (1993, Appendix B) for more
details). All regressions cluster standard errors on the family, except for the Tobit IV speciﬁcations, which
is estimated using a minimum distance estimator (Newey, 1987). In the IV speciﬁcations, we instrument for
the share of families in a given coinsurance and MDE plan who hit the MDE with the “simulated” share
hitting the MDE; the “simulated” share is calculated as the share of the full ( =5 653) sample which,
given their observed spending, would have hit the MDE if (counterfactually) assigned to the given plan; the
coeﬃcient on the instrument in the ﬁrst stage is 1.05 (standard error 0.003); the F-statistic on the instrument
is 120,000. Appendix Table A6 provides more details on the plans in the RAND experiment, the distribution
of the sample across the diﬀerent plans, and the share of families who hit the MDE in each plan.
 Dependent variable is ( +1 )where  is the total medical spending of the employee and any covered
family members in their ﬁrst three months in the plan.
 Dependent variable is ( +1 )where  is the total medical spending of the employee and any covered
family members in their full year in the plan.
 Dependent variable is () where “time” is the number of days to ﬁrst claim by any covered family
member, censored at 367 days
55Appendix Table A8: Fit of the calibration exercise of medical events
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
Mean of log spending 6.57 6.53 2.08 1.61 6.18 6.06
Standard deviation of log spending 2.17 2.10 3.58 3.28 1.96 2.04
Share with any spending 93.7% 93.8% 25.8% 19.7% 93.5% 92.5%
Total Spending Inpatient Outpatient
The table reports summary statistics of the actual and simulated moments of the spending distribution
for the RAND “free care” plan. Log spending is computed as log(spending+1) to avoid missing values.
Simulated data are generated as described in Appendix B.










0 1 9 . 90 . 3 00 . 2 00 . 6 0
0.1 10.1 0.25 0.20 0.56
0.2 15.5 0.25 0.20 0.56
0.3 11.6 0.30 0.25 0.55
0.4 11.9 0.30 0.25 0.55
0.5 14.0 0.35 0.30 0.54
0.6 16.6 0.35 0.30 0.54
0.7 24.5 0.35 0.30 0.54
0.8 34.6 0.35 0.35 0.50
0.9 28.7 0.35 0.35 0.50





Coins. 25% Coins. 50% Coins. 95% Coins. 25% Coins. 50% Coins. 95% Coins. 25% Coins. 50% Coins. 95%
6.08 6.04 5.53 2.36 2.35 2.71 90.7% 90.7% 85.2%
0 113.9 6.09 5.92 5.28 2.28 2.39 2.81 91.8% 90.6% 84.0%
0.1 45.3 6.09 5.93 5.39 2.28 2.39 2.77 91.8% 90.6% 84.8%
0.2 20.1 6.09 5.94 5.46 2.28 2.39 2.75 91.8% 90.6% 85.3%
0.3 11.6 6.10 5.95 5.52 2.28 2.39 2.73 91.8% 90.7% 85.7%
0.4 11.9 6.10 5.95 5.57 2.28 2.39 2.72 91.8% 90.7% 86.0%
0.5 17.7 6.10 5.96 5.61 2.28 2.39 2.71 91.8% 90.7% 86.3%
0.6 27.6 6.10 5.97 5.65 2.28 2.39 2.70 91.8% 90.7% 86.5%
0.7 40.3 6.11 5.98 5.68 2.28 2.38 2.69 91.8% 90.7% 86.7%
0.8 55.8 6.11 5.99 5.72 2.28 2.38 2.68 91.9% 90.8% 86.9%
0.9 74.1 6.11 6.00 5.75 2.28 2.38 2.67 91.9% 90.8% 87.1%
1 97.5 6.11 6.01 5.79 2.28 2.38 2.67 91.9% 90.8% 87.2%
Mean log spending Std. Dev. of log spending Share with zero spending
Actual (observed moments)
The top panel reports the values of  and  that minimize the objective function for diﬀerent values of .
The bottom panel reports goodness of ﬁt measures for our choice of  =0 3 and  =0 25 for diﬀerent values
of . Log spending is computed as log(spending+1) to avoid missing values. Simulated data are generated
as described in Appendix B.
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